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The United States currently faces an environment of constrained resources and 
increasing threats where new foreign policy options need to be considered. An area that 
holds the potential for low-profile campaigns to confront enemies of the United States is 
cyber-enabled unconventional warfare (UW). Conducting military operations through 
cyber-enabled UW is less expensive, and inherently, it involves less physical risk than a 
conventional deployment of U.S. military personnel abroad. This research indicates that 
seven conditions exist in the cyberspace environment that can enhance the conduct of 
UW. Since no organization in the U.S. military with the requisite capabilities to exploit 
these conditions in the cyber domain exists, one should be created. Cyber-enabled UW 
can provide scalable military options to U.S. policymakers that are currently not 
available. 
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Given current U.S. reluctance to commit conventional troops and an environment 
of constrained resources, alternate military strategies to support foreign policy aims are 
urgently needed. An area that holds the potential for low-profile campaigns to confront 
enemies of the United States is the application of unconventional warfare (UW) working 
by, with, and through indigenous groups via cyberspace-based operations or cyber-
enabled UW. Conducting military operations through cyber-enabled UW is less 
expensive and inherently involves less risk than a conventional deployment of U.S. 
military personnel abroad. Additionally, cyber-enabled UW can provide scalable military 
options to U.S. policymakers that are currently not available. This thesis will identify and 
explore conditions that can facilitate the conduct of cyber-enabled UW operations by 
examining cases in which state and non-state actors mobilized populations in UW-like 
operations that exploited the cyber domain. 
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
UW has been defined in a number of different ways. For the purposes of this 
thesis, the U.S. definition of UW will be used as a guiding principle. Under this 
definition, U.S. forces infiltrate into enemy-held territory to identify, recruit, and 
operationalize underground, auxiliary, and paramilitary forces toward the purpose of 
sabotage, subversion, or to overthrow an enemy regime.1 
                                                 
1 Department of the Army, Army Special Operations Forces [FM 3-05 (FM100-25)] (Washington, 
DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006); Department of the Army, Army Special Operations 
Forces Unconventional Warfare (FM 3-05.130) (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
2008); Department of the Army, Special Forces: Unconventional Warfare (TC 18-01) (Washington, DC: 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2010), https://nsnbc.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/special-forces-
uw-tc-18-01.pdf; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations (JP 3-05) (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2014), http://dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf; Special Warfare Center and Schools, A 
Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare (SWCS PUB 09-1) (Fort Bragg, NC: Special Warfare 
Center and School, 2009); U.S. Army Special Operations Command, “ARSOF 2022,” Special Warfare 
Magazine 26, no. 2 (April-June 2013); U.S. Army Special Operations Command, “ARSOF 2022 Part 2: 
Changing the Institution,” Special Warfare Magazine 27, no. 3 (September 2014); U.S. Army Special 
Operations Command, “Counter-Unconventional Warfare” (White Paper), September 26, 2014. 
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The Internet has provided militaries around the world with another domain in 
which to operate, cyberspace. Over three billion people have access to the Internet, and 
the number grows each day. It is imperative that Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
understand how networks operate in this domain to enhance UW. Starting in the 1990s, 
leading scholars began looking at how networks operate in cyberspace and the objectives 
they could achieve.2 This quickly led to the military operationalizing the cyber domain 
and new areas of study to include cyberwar and cyberspace operations.3 
The advent of social media in particular has forced the evolution of concepts 
presented in collective action, social movement theory, and social network analysis into 
another operational realm, cyberspace. The information revolution has spawned 
thousands, if not millions, of digital networks. If it is to be successful in the next 
generation of UW, SOF must be fully prepared to exploit this domain. 
While the U.S. military strove to wage two largely conventional military 
campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, adversarial state and non-state actors were perfecting 
their use of cyberspace-based operations. The Department of Defense defines these 
operations as “the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to 
achieve objectives in or through cyberspace,” to include both overt and covert 
                                                 
2 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar Is Coming!” Comparative Strategy 12, no. 2 (April 
1993): 141–65, doi: 10.1080/01495939308402915; John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and 
Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001); William C. Boni 
and Gerald L. Kovacich, Netspionage: The Global Threat to Information (Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann, 
2000). 
3 John Arquilla and Douglas A. Borer, Information Strategy and Warfare: A Guide to Theory and 
Practice (New York: Routledge, 2007); Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake, Cyber War: The Next 
Threat to National Security and What to Do About It (New York: Tantor, 2014); Christopher R. Eidman 
and Gregory S. Green, “Unconventional Cyber Warfare: Cyber Opportunities in Unconventional Warfare” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord& 
metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA607604; James A. Lewis, “Assessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism: 
Cyber War and Other Cyber Threats,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2002; Dorothy E. 
Denning, “Cyber Conflict as an Emergent Social Phenomenon,” in Corporate Hacking and Technology-
Driven Crime: Social Dynamics and Implications, ed. Thomas J. Holt and Bernadette H. Schell (Hershey, 
PA: Information Science Reference, 2011), doi: 10.4018/978-1-61692-805-6; Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Cyber 
Power,” Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, May 2010, 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA522626; Martin C. 
Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009); William J. Lynn III, 
“Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 5 (2010): 97–108. 
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objectives.4 In 2014, Russia quietly used cyberspace operations to support its annexation 
of Crimea, sovereign Ukrainian territory. Additionally, the Islamic State has used 
cyberspace to help recruit a terrorist army and administer a de-facto state. Over the past 
decade and a half, enemies of the United States have been successfully harnessing the 
power of Internet technologies to conduct cyberspace operations to enhance recruitment, 
organize their forces, and execute operations. In order to explore how the United States 
can update its model of unconventional warfare, we studied the following research 
question: Under what conditions can cyberspace operations be used to enhance 
unconventional warfare? 
1. Claims 
We make two general claims. First, the low cost of entry, sparse regulations, and 
relative anonymity of users in the virtual environment facilitates social mobilization and 
recruiting of proxy forces during UW cyberspace operations.5 Second, the speed of 
transmitting information and the vast amount of multi-media content available makes 
cyberspace an excellent platform for large social movements, specifically UW resistance 
groups and their underground support networks, to organize, train, and eventually 
conduct operations.6 
                                                 
4 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Cyberspace Operations [JP 3-12 (R)] (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_12R.pdf. 
5 Damon M. Centola, “Homophily, Networks, and Critical Mass: Solving the Start-up Problem in 
Large Group Collective Action,” Rationality and Society 25, no. 1 (February 2013): 3–40, doi: 
10.1177/1043463112473734; Mancur Olson The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory 
of Groups (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 2002); Elinor Ostrom, “A Behavioral Approach to the 
Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science 
Association, 1997,” American Political Science Review 92, no. 1 (March 1998): 1–22, doi: 
10.2307/2585925; Elinor Ostrom, “Analyzing Collective Action,” Agricultural Economics 41 (November 
2010): 155–66, doi: 10.1111/j.1574-0862.2010.00497.x; Elinor Ostrom, “Collective Action and the 
Evolution of Social Norms,” Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research 6, no. 4 (2014): 235–52, doi: 
10.1080/19390459.2014.935173. 
6 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996); Doowan Lee and Glenn W. Johnson, “Revisiting the Social Movement 
Approach to Unconventional Warfare,” Small Wars Journal, December 1, 2014, 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/revisiting-the-social-movement-approach-to-unconventional-warfare; 
Doowan Lee, “A Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare” Special Warfare 26, no. 3 
(September 2013) 27–32; Karl-Dieter Opp, Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements: A 
Multidisciplinary Introduction, Critique, and Synthesis (London: Routledge, 2009). 
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B. METHODOLOGY 
The main body of the research will utilize an exploratory design to provide 
evidence in support of the claims stated in the previous section. We will accomplish this 
through an analysis of information at the empirical level. We will also employ a 
comparative case study analysis to identify conditions explaining our proposed outcomes. 
We have identified four cases to inform and guide our research: 1) Service Unit 
Detachment 101’s use of proxy forces and UW techniques in Burma during World War 
II; 2) Russia’s use of cyber-enabled operations against the Republic of Georgia; 3) 
Russia’s use of cyberspace operations against Crimea and the Ukraine, 4) Al Suri’s 
Global Islamic Resistance Call and the Islamic State’s employment of it, which 
illustrates non-state actor use of the Internet for the purposes of recruiting, training, and 
executing operations. These case studies were selected for our research because Service 
Unit Detachment 101 is often touted as one of the most successful UW operations 
conducted in WWII and provides a pure example of UW tactics, techniques, and 
procedures. Additionally, the Russian and non-state actor case studies were selected 
because they are some of the most current instances of exploitation of the cyber domain 
to conduct UW-like operations. The basic scenario and significance of each of these case 
studies will be expanded upon in the next section. 
After conducting a UW literature review (Chapter II) and analysis of a classic 
U.S. UW operation, Service Unit Detachment 101 (Chapter III), the following four 
activities—recruitment, indoctrination, training, and operationalizing proxy forces—were 
determined to be required for a successful UW operation. The research will examine two 
areas of knowledge: social mobilization and cyberspace operations through the lens of the 
four activities (recruiting, indoctrinating, training, and operationalizing proxy forces) to 
identify conditions that enhance UW. The first part of the research will provide the base 
theoretical underpinnings to support how UW, as a subset of social mobilization, can 
utilize conditions provided by information age technologies (particularly digital and 
Internet platforms) to enhance operations in cyberspace. In this bin of research, collective 
action theory, social movement theory, social network analysis (particularly analysis of 
dark networks), and UW doctrine will be considered. 
 5 
1. Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework for this thesis is broken down into three major areas of 
study. The first area of study is unconventional warfare and the hallmarks of a successful 
U.S. UW operation. The second area of study is the social mobilization of populations. 
The final area of study focuses on case studies of UW-like operations that utilized 
cyberspace operations. 
a. Unconventional Warfare and Hallmarks of Successful UW 
The UW area of study will define UW and use the Service Detachment Unit 101 
case study to examine and extract details pertinent to successful techniques for recruiting, 
training, and operationalizing proxy forces.7 The Department of Defense defines 
unconventional warfare as “[activities] conducted to enable a resistance movement or 
insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by 
operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied 
area.”8 Within the U.S. military, U.S. Army Special Operations is designated as the 
primary organization to conduct UW. As such, U.S. Army Special Operations has 
identified UW as being composed of seven phases: preparation, initial contact, 
infiltration, organization and training, build-up, employment, and transition.9 Service 
Detachment Unit 101 is often touted as one of the most successful U.S. UW operations 
                                                 
7 Steven J. Cox, “Role of SOF in Paramilitary Operations” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 1995), http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/31295; Roger Hilsman, American Guerrilla: My War 
behind Japanese Lines (Nebraska: Potomac Books, 1990); Derek Jones, “Ending the Debate: 
Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, and Why Words Matter” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army 
Command and General Staff College, 2006), http://ftp.fas.org/man/eprint/jones.pdf; Richard D. Newton et 
al., Contemporary Security Challenges: Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches (Hurlburt Field, FL: 
Joint Special Operations Univ. Press, 2009); Troy James Sacquety, “The Organizational Evolution of OSS 
Detachment 101 in Burma, 1942–1945” (doctoral dissertation, Texas A&M Univ., 2008), 
http://repository.tamu.edu/bitstream/handle/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-3280/SACQUETY-DISSERTATION.pdf 
?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; John J. Tierney Jr., Chasing Ghosts: Unconventional Warfare in American 
History (Washington, DC: Potomac, 2006); Randall D. Wenner, “Detachment 101 in the CBI: An 
Unconventional Warfare Paradigm for Contemporary Special Operations” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army 
Command and General Staff College, 2010), http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix= 
html&identifier=ADA523185. 
8 Joint Chiefs of Staff. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JP 1-02) 
(Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010), 263, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. 
9 Department of the Army, Special Forces (TC 18-01), 1-8–1-9. 
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and was conducted in WWII. This case study will illustrate UW tactics, techniques, and 
procedures prior to the advent of cyberspace operations and Internet technologies. 
b. Social Mobilization of Populations 
To understand the social mobilization area of study, investigation into three 
theoretical underpinnings is necessary: collective action, social movement theory, and 
social network analysis. The first subcategory of this group of research is collective 
action, which explains why individuals establish groups and organizations for common 
causes.10 Of particular interest to this research is the “start-up problem” and what 
motivates individuals to move past selfish motivation and engage in collective 
behavior.11 
Related to collective action is the second subcategory, social movement theory 
(SMT). The concepts contained in the SMT literature connect micro-level (individual) 
incentives to macro-level (societal) events.12 The study of social movements provides 
SOF with an understanding of how large groups of individuals can come together to 
make major changes in society, a critical piece in any UW campaign. 
                                                 
10 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 
(Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 2009); Damon M. Centola, “Homophily, Networks, and Critical Mass: 
Solving the Start-up Problem in Large Group Collective Action,” Rationality and Society 25, no. 1 
(February 2013): 3–40, doi: 10.1177/1043463112473734; Roger V. Gould, “Collective Action and 
Network Structure,” American Sociological Review 58, no. 2 (April 1993), doi:10.2307/2095965; Gerald 
Marwell, Pamela E. Oliver, and Ralph Prahl, “Social Networks and Collective Action: A Theory of the 
Critical Mass. III,” American Journal of Sociology 94, no. 3 (1988): 502–34; Brian Petit, “Social Media 
and UW,” Special Warfare Magazine 25, no. 2 (2012), http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/archive/SW2502/ 
SW2502SocialMediaAndUW.html.; Aldon Morris, “Reflections on Social Movement Theory: Criticisms 
and Proposals,” Contemporary Sociology 29, no. 3 (May 2000): 445, doi: 10.2307/2653931; Pamela E. 
Oliver, “Formal Models of Collective Action,” Annual Review of Sociology 19, (1993): 271–300; Elinor 
Ostrom, “A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential 
Address, American Political Science Association, 1997,” American Political Science Review 92, no. 1 
(March 1998): 1; Elinor Ostrom, “Analyzing Collective Action,” Agricultural Economics 41, no. s1 
(November 2010): 155–66; Ostrom, “Collective Action and the Evolution.” 
11 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 
(Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 2009). 
12 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996); Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, Frontiers in Social 
Movement Theory (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1992); Melissa Y. Lerner, “Connecting the Actual 
with the Virtual: The Internet and Social Movement Theory in the Muslim World—The Cases of Iran and 
Egypt,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 30, no. 4 (December 2010): 555–74; Morris, “Reflections on 
Social Movement Theory,” 445; Karl-Dieter Opp, Theories of Political Protest. 
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The third subcategory concerning the mobilization of populations is social 
network analysis (SNA). This area of research digs deeper into existing networks to 
determine relationships between their various, and sometimes disparate, members.13 A 
critical subset of this research is the analysis of dark networks.14 Dark networks are 
primarily viewed as criminal and terrorist networks.15 Exiled resistance groups, necessary 
for UW, are also considered dark networks because they attempt to keep their 
membership hidden.16  
c. Conceptual Diagram 
In order to illustrate in each of the case studies the conditions present in 
successful cyber-enabled UW-like operations, the following framework for analysis 
depicted in Figure 1 is used: 
  
                                                 
13 Kirk A. Duncan, “Assessing the Use of Social Media in a Revolutionary Environment” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/34660; Sean F. Everton, 
Disrupting Dark Networks (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012); Christina Prell, Social Network 
Analysis: History, Theory and Methodology (London: SAGE, 2012); René M. Bakker, Jörg Raab, and H. 
Brinton Milward, “A Preliminary Theory of Dark Network Resilience,” Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management 31, no. 1 (winter 2012): 33–62, doi: 10.1002/pam.20619; Sean S. Everton, “Tracking, 
Destabilizing and Disrupting Dark Networks with Social Networks Analysis” (Version 1.05), Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2008, http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/34415 Mark S. Granovetter, “The 
Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6 (May 1973): 1360–80; Michael McBride 
and David Hewitt, “The Enemy You Can’t See: An Investigation of the Disruption of Dark Networks,” 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 93 (September 2013): 32–50, doi: 10.1016/ 
j.jebo.2013.07.004; Nancy Roberts and Sean F. Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” 





Figure 1.  Analysis Framework 
 
 
Across the bottom of the diagram are the four activities, recruiting, indoctrinating, 
training, and operationalizing, which are identified in the UW literature review and 
Service Unit Detachment 101 case study and will be analyzed in-depth. On the left hand 
side, factors enhancing social mobilization will identify the techniques used within each 
of the four categories. Each column will be filled with examples from the case studies. 
2. Case Studies 
To date, no state or non-state actor has publicly acknowledged (or published) a 
formal model of cyber-enabled UW. As such, conditions necessary for the execution of 
UW through cyberspace operations must be extracted from historical examples in which 
state and non-state entities use information age technologies for recruiting, indoctrinating, 
training, and executing UW-like operations. 
a. Service Unit Detachment 101 
During World War II, the United States conducted a wide variety of special 
operations, including UW. In many of these campaigns, limited success was achieved. 
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One noted exception to this rule is Service Unit Detachment 101’s (DET 101) operations 
in Burma. Prior to examining case studies pertaining to how both state and non-state 
actors have used cyber-enabled capabilities to enhance and execute UW-like operations, 
it is prudent to examine an example of successful UW prior to the advent of the Internet 
and other information age technologies. 
b. Russia versus Georgia: The South Ossetia Campaign 
In its 2008 campaign to annex South Ossetia, Russia, used military force in order 
to take territory and further their perceived national security interests, disregarding the 
borders of sovereign nations.17 In addition to conventional warfare, there is evidence that 
Russia also employed a massive cyber-attack and information warfare campaign. 
Although Russia denies any involvement in the cyber and propaganda warfare that was 
executed in close proximity with (and in preparation for) conventional operations, closer 
scrutiny indicates that there was coordination between “hacktivists” and organized 
criminal organizations.18 
                                                 
17 Jolanta Darczewska, “The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare: The Crimean Operation, A 
Case Study,” OSW Point of View, vol. 42, Centre for Eastern Studies, May 2014. 
18 Robert M. Cutler, “Russia’s Disinformation Campaign over South Ossetia,” Central Asia-Caucasus 
Institute Analyst 10, no. 16 (August 2008): 6–8; Ronald J. Deibert, Rafal Rohozinski, and Masashi Crete-
Nishihata, “Cyclones in Cyberspace: Information Shaping and Denial in the 2008 Russia–Georgia War,” 
Security Dialogue 43, no. 1 (February 2012): 3–24, doi: 10.1177/0967010611431079; James P. Farwell, 
and Rafal Rohozinski, “Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War,” Survival 53, no. 1 (2011): 23–40, doi: 
10.1080/00396338.2011.555586; George Friedman, “The Russo-Georgian War and the Balance of Power,” 
Stratfor, August 12, 2008, http://blog.cafewall.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/rus-v-geo-analysis.pdf; 
Valery Gerasimov, “The New Generation Warfare,” VPK News, March 27, 2013, http://vpk-news.ru/sites/ 
default/files/pdf/VPK_08_476.pdf; Keir Giles, “‘Information Troops’-A Russian Cyber Command,” 
proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Cyber Conflict, Tallinn, Estonia, June 7–10, 2011, 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=5954699; Sanjay Goel, “Cyberwarfare: Connecting 
the Dots in Cyber Intelligence,” Communications of the ACM 54, no. 8 (August 2011): 132–40, doi: 
10.1145/1978542.1978569; David Hollis, “Cyber War Case Study: Georgia 2008,” Small Wars Journal 7, 
no. 1 (January 2011); Athina Karatzogianni, “Blame it on the Russians: Tracking the Portrayal of Russians 
During Cyber conflict Incidents,” Digital Icons: Studies in Russian, Eurasian and Central European New 
Media 4 (2010): 128–50; Stephen W. Korns and Joshua E. Kastenberg, “Georgia’s Cyber Left Hook,” 
Parameters 38, no. 4 (winter 2008–9): 60–76; Marian Lazar, “Russian Cyber Campaign against Georgia,” 
In The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment (Bucharest, Romania: National Defense 
Univ., 2012), 500–6; Paolo Shakarian, “The 2008 Russian Cyber Campaign against Georgia,” Military 
Review 91, no. 6 (November-December 2011): 63–68; Timothy L. Thomas, “The Bear Went through the 
Mountain: Russia Appraises its Five-Day War in South Ossetia,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 22, no. 
1 (2009): 31–67, doi: 10.1080/13518040802695241. 
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In this new form of information warfare, Russia is now utilizing old propaganda 
techniques, from the days of the Soviet Union, packaged in new age technologies 
(particularly Internet-based social media).19 The 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict is 
significant because it provides an example of a highly sophisticated operation in the 
cyber-domain with results that manifested in the real world. 
c. Russia versus Ukraine: The Crimea Annexation 
In February 2014, Russia used cyberspace operations to initiate an unconventional 
warfare campaign against Crimea that severed the Ukrainian military and security 
services command and control capabilities resulting in the ultimate annexation of Crimea 
by Russia.20 Additionally, as the operation was being conducted, Russia employed 
numerous information warfare techniques including cyberattacks, propaganda and 
deception operations using proxy Internet “troll armies” and numerous social media 
platforms to enhance and garner support for its UW paramilitary forces operating within 
Ukraine.21 
This case study may be the most important in seeking an answer to the research 
question of this thesis, as Russian cyberspace operations were conducted as part of a 
successful UW operation, the annexation of Crimea. Furthermore, Russia continues to 
adapt, refine and conduct cyberspace operations to assist its UW efforts in eastern 
Ukraine, providing current techniques, tactics, and procedures for analysis. 
d. Non-state Actors 
The use of the Internet by non-state actors, particularly terrorist organizations, is 
not a new occurrence. In fact, by the turn of the last century, nearly all terrorist 
organizations, both foreign and domestic, began to use and exploit the Internet for a 
                                                 
19 Daisy Sindelar, “Inside Russia’s Disinformation Campaign,” Atlantic, August 12, 2014, 
http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2014/08/inside-russias-disinformation-campaign/91286/. 
20 Michael R. Gordon, “Russia Displays a New Military Prowess in Ukraine’s East,” New York Times, 
April 21, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/world/europe/new-prowess-for-russians.html?_r=0. 
21 Ibid.; Sindelar, “Inside Russia’s Disinformation Campaign.” 
 11 
variety of purposes.22 An examination of Al Suri’s Global Islamic Resistance Call, which 
he published in 2004, reveals a blueprint for how Al-Qaeda should train and conduct 
operations. It also shows how the Internet should serve as a platform for this as well as a 
way to reach a mass audience.23 Al-Suri established the foundation currently used by the 
Islamic State, which has become the poster child for how terrorist organizations can 
conduct de-centralized global UW activities, including recruiting, training, and executing 
operations using cyberspace as a platform.24 
C. THESIS OVERVIEW AND OUTLINE 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II discusses theories 
relevant to the mobilization of populations, specifically collective action, social 
movement theory, and social network analysis, and the roles of these theories in UW. 
Chapter III describes unconventional warfare and uses the “Service Detachment Unit 
101” case study to identify successful techniques for the recruiting, indoctrinating, 
training, and operationalizing proxy forces. Additionally, Chapter III covers the other 
three case studies outlined above. Chapter IV contains our analysis and the conditions 
necessary for cyberspace operations to enhance UW in relation to recruitment, 
indoctrination, training, and operationalizing proxy forces. Chapter IV also provides the 
authors recommendations for the creation of a cyber-enabled UW team. Finally, Chapter 
V provides the authors’ conclusions and suggestions for future inquiry and research. 
  
                                                 
22 Gabriel Weimann, “www.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet” Special Report 116, 
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Lacey, A Terrorist’s Call to Global Jihad: Deciphering Abu Musab Al-Suri’s Islamic Jihad Manifesto 
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II. SOCIAL MOBILIZATION 
In order to identify and understand critical factors necessary for the successful 
execution of cyber-enabled UW, the key concepts of theories of social mobilization need 
to be extracted. UW is in essence a form of social mobilization in order to obtain a 
strategic objective in a target country. This section will first examine the history and 
current U.S. doctrine related to UW. The second section will examine the cyber-domain 
and how it relates to UW and social mobilization. The next three sections will present a 
brief review of three theories, collective action theory, social movement theory (SMT), 
and social network analysis (SNA), to summarize key aspects of the theory and extract 
critical concepts. The final section will analyze the theories and attempt to find 
commonalities between critical ideas. 
A. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
The United States Army Special Operations Command has recently placed 
additional emphasis on examining UW as a strategic option for policy makers. Although 
UW has been recently highlighted, it is by no means a new or innovative technique. 
Looking solely at the U.S. history of using this form of warfare, its origins can be traced 
back to before the Declaration of Independence was even signed. Prior to the conflicts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, at least sixteen American conflicts have included elements of 
warfare that could be labeled unconventional in nature.25 
American UW doctrine and theory was primarily extracted from U.S. and Allied 
actions conducted in World War II (WWII). These operations were initially conducted 
under the purview of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS) and primarily included strategic support of resistance groups and 
                                                 
25 Tierney, Chasing Ghosts. 
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sabotage missions in occupied Europe and Asia.26 The two most noteworthy efforts of 
these groups (and arguably most successful) were the Jedburghs operations in occupied 
France and Detachment 101’s operations in Burma.27 
According to the Department of Defense’s Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms, UW is defined as “[activities] conducted to enable a resistance movement or 
insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by 
operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied 
area.”28 U.S. Army Special Operations additionally identifies seven phases of UW: 
preparation, initial contact, infiltration, organization and training, build-up, employment, 
transition.29 
Throughout the years, UW has been referred to using many different monikers 
including guerrilla warfare, insurrectionary warfare, revolutionary warfare, and even 
class warfare.30 It is also regularly confused with irregular warfare, which (according to 
the U.S. definition) is an umbrella term for any operation that involves a conflict between 
a state and a counter-state.31 Within irregular warfare, there are five types of activities, 
one of which is UW. The other four include activities where U.S. forces support a state 
against a counter-state: Foreign Internal Defense, Security Force Assistance, Counter 
Terrorism, and Counter Insurgency. UW represents the one activity where the United 
States would support the efforts of a counter-state against the state.32 
                                                 
26 Will Irwin, The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces, France 1944 (New 
York: PublicAffairs, 2009); Alfred H. Paddock Jr., US Army Special Warfare, Its Origins: Psychological 







28 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JP 1-02), 263. 
29 Department of the Army, Special Forces (TC 18-01), 1-8–1-9. 
30 Andrew C. Janos, “Unconventional Warfare: Framework and Analysis.” World Politics 15, no. 4 
(July 1963): 636–46. doi:10.2307/2009460. 
31 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JP 1-02), 134. 
32 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations (TC 18-01), II-1–II-18. 
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The U.S. Army identifies seven phases of UW. The first phase of UW is 
preparation, which includes intelligence, operational, and psychological preparation of 
the environment for unconventional warfare. The second phase is initial contact with 
resistance groups or governments in exile. The third phase is infiltration of U.S. forces 
into denied or occupied territory to link-up with resistance groups. The fourth phase is 
organizing and training of resistance groups into inactive support, active support, and 
armed groups. The fifth phase is the building-up of the capacity and capability of 
resistance organizations. The sixth phase is employment of resistance groups. This phase 
lasts until active conflict ends or the fight is transitioned to be executed using 
conventional means. The seventh and final phase is transition in which armed resistance 
groups are either stood down, or transitioned into security forces of the new 
government.33 
Although there are many tasks and sub-tasks contained in the seven phases of 
UW, through our literature review we identified are four critical activities that most 
influence the success of organizations attempting to conduct warfare through proxy 
groups. The first of these is the recruitment of suitable participants. This activity occurs 
in the first through third phases of UW.34 The second activity is indoctrination, or 
reinforcing the message and underlying motivation behind the UW campaign. This 
activity takes place primarily in the third through fifth phase of UW, but will also 
continue through the entire life of the resistance group.35 The third activity is training of 
proxy forces. By definition, training is conducted in the fourth phase of UW, but also 
continues through the fifth and sixth phase.36 The final activity is operationalization of 
the counter-state group. This activity is associated with the sixth phase of UW.37 
The risks of joining an active insurgency are inherently very high. Counter-state 
groups start very small and must overcome challenging obstacles if they are to achieve 
                                                 






any measure of success. Many factors must be present for an individual to overlook these 
risks and literally place their life on the line for a political or military movement. 
Collective action theory analyzes why individuals coalesce into groups, sometimes 
despite the rewards or risks that might be present. 
B. THE CYBER DOMAIN 
Social mobilization, through traditional websites, blogs, social media, and all 
other manor of platforms, is a persistent and prevalent phenomenon in the digital world. 
The use of these platforms also falls within the spectrum of cyberspace operations as 
defined by U.S. doctrine.38 The low cost of entry, sparse regulations, ease of anonymity 
and secrecy, the speed of information, and wide availability of multimedia content make 
the Internet a conducive environment for growing and cultivating resistance 
organizations.39 
In their influential 1993 paper, “Cyberwar is Coming!” Arquilla and Ronfeldt 
noted that the information revolution brought into being technologies that would have 
profound impacts on the nature of warfare. They introduced the concepts of cyberwar and 
netwar.40 They later expanded on the ideas of this original paper in their book Networks 
and Netwars, and introduced the influential idea that future conflicts will primarily be 
fought between networks and networked organizations, and traditional hierarchies will 
struggle to compete in this environment.41 
Cyber warfare is often imagined as complicated hacking schemes to steal data, 
attacks to corrupt and degrade an opponent’s command and control infrastructure, or 
even perhaps infect the systems of critical online infrastructures.42 It can also be 
classified as form of low intensity conflict, where propaganda and social influence 
                                                 
38 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Cyberspace Operations [JP 3-12 (R)]. 
39 Weimann, “How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet.” Portions also extracted from “Conflict in the 
Information Age” course paper entitled “The anatomy of online recruitment,” by Ryan Gladding. 
40 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar Is Coming!” 141–65. 
41 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, ix–xii. 
42 Goel, “Cyberwarfare,” 132–140. 
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techniques are garnered to bolster support for a social or political cause. This new realm 
of conflict has important implications for the conduct of both insurgency and counter-
insurgency warfare.43 
Activities associated with cyber-enabled UW include identifying, contacting, 
training, building, and operationalizing resistance groups through social media, blogs, 
and websites. Key insurgency leaders can be identified and cultivated without ever 
deploying U.S. troops to hostile areas. Additionally, online armies with the capabilities to 
sabotage critical communications can be recruited, trained, and mobilized. Propaganda, 
psychological, and information operations can be utilized to shape public and 
international perceptions, all within the digital realm. A discussion of social mobilization 
will provide the theoretical base to discuss the activities (identified above) pertaining to 
proxy warfare and cyber-enabled UW. 
C. COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Collective action theory principally examines the micro-level of group actions. It 
essentially explains individual motivations to join groups to produce mutual rewards. 
Other factors lead to group formation, particularly when social change, and not financial 
reward, is the desired goal. Revolutionary group activity is a core consideration of UW. 
Given this fact, understanding individuals’ internal motivations to join and become 
productive members of groups is critically important. 
Prior to 1965, most social scientists assumed that individuals with common or 
shared interests would likely group together to obtain common goals. The theory held 
that, individual interests and group interests are generally linked and there is little 
difference between the two.44 In 1965, an economist, Olson, presented an argument in 
opposition to this concept. Olson stated that if there is no way for the collective rewards 
of group membership to be withheld, then individuals in the group have no motivation to 
                                                 
43 Samuel Liles, “Cyber Warfare: As a Form of Low-Intensity Conflict and Insurgency,” proceedings 
of the 3rd International Conference on Cyber Conflict, Tallinn, Estonia, June 7–10, 2011, 47–57, 
https://ccdcoe.org/publications/2010proceedings/Liles%20-%20Cyber%20warfare%20%20As%20a%20 
form%20of%20low-intensity%20conflict%20and%20insurgency.pdf. 
44 Oliver, “Formal Models of Collective Action,” 272–75. 
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contribute. This causes a problem, in which members have the ability to contribute little 
or nothing to the group’s objectives, while still being able to reap the rewards obtained by 
the group. This is termed the “free-rider” problem in collective action.45 From Olson’s 
and others’ research (particularly that of Ostrom), six factors can be identified as helping 
to overcome the free-rider problem and therefore increase the likelihood for collective 
action.46 
The first factor affecting collective action is group size. Moderately sized groups 
are most able to overcome collective action problems and therefore should be the core of 
a UW network. As the size of the group increases, the cost (in resources) of maintaining 
the group also increases. Additionally, in large groups identifying the contributions of 
individual members and coming to agreements regarding group strategy is significantly 
more challenging.47 On the other side of the argument, very small groups cannot easily 
generate the resources necessary to achieve their objectives effectively.48 
The second factor affecting collective action is resource distribution. How group 
revenues are distributed can influence an individual’s motivation to engage in collective 
action and should be a factor considered by leadership within a resistance organization. If 
group returns are divided evenly among members, it increases the tendency of members 
in larger groups to free ride. If benefits are not divided equally, and are instead pooled 
and then distributed to members, other issues (related to group size may) arise, 
particularly disputes over equal distribution.49 
UW organizations have historically been uniquely equipped to interact and 
communicate with diverse cultures. The third factor affecting collective action is how 
group heterogeneity, including common interests, ideas, culture, language, or other 
factors can lead an individual to engage in collective action, even if the payoff for group 
participation is less than desired. Identifying and exploiting heterogeneous groups is 
                                                 
45 Olson, Logic of Collective Action. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ostrom, “Analyzing Collective Action,” 157. 
49 Ibid. 
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likely to be a major contributing factor in overcoming the free-rider issue as insurgent 
groups grow larger.50 
Traditional UW organizations have relied on small groups to effect personal 
communications with potential resistance groups. The fourth factor, personal, or face-to-
face, communication is shown to be a contributor to overcoming collective action 
dilemmas. This effect is due to non-verbal communication’s potential to increase trust 
between group participants, thereby increasing the potential for group participation.51 
Advances in digital communication technologies, including video teleconferencing and 
potentially even virtual reality, will mitigate negative effects previously associated with 
distant communication techniques. 
Two additional factors of collective action should be carefully considered by UW 
planners when developing individual networks. These involve what information a 
prospective group member has regarding the group’s previous actions and the nature of 
how the network is linked together. The fifth factor indicates that the more information 
an individual has on the group’s past, the more likely they will be to engage in collective 
action.52 The sixth encompasses how members of the group are linked together including 
both their strong, weak, internal, and external ties. Social ties can bring members into the 
group or dispel members from it. These ties can also indicate how information, resources, 
and benefits move through the network..53 
These six factors are applicable to developing interactions that will lead to a 
social model of collective action and contribute to the success of any UW activity. 
Contained within these factors are several core concepts. These concepts are trust, 
reciprocity, and reputation.54 Trust between all members is a key variable in group 
behavior. If trust disintegrates then the social interaction will likely soon follow. 
                                                 
50 Centola, “Homophily, Networks, and Critical Mass,” 3–40; Ostrom, “Analyzing Collective Action,” 
158. 
51 Ostrom, “Analyzing Collective Action,” 158. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Centola, “Homophily, Networks, and Critical Mass”; Granovetter, “Strength of Weak Ties,” 1360–
80; Ostrom, “Analyzing Collective Action.” 
54 Ostrom, “Behavioral Approach.” 
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Reciprocity between individuals, particularly in the area of trust, will eventually lead to a 
positive reputation of the group. The status of a group is a crucial element in increasing 
the likelihood that collective action will happen, and it will additionally improve the 
chances for sustained collective action.55 
D. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
Since it is unlikely that a UW operation will seek to create a new revolutionary 
organization by incentivizing individuals, another theory needs to be examined to 
determine external factors that influence a group’s productivity. Social movements are a 
particular form of collective action that are brought into being by societal pressures or the 
desire to change some aspect of oppressive state control.56 McAdam, a leading scholar on 
social movements, roughly defines them as “loosely organized, loosely coordinated, 
sustained struggles to promote or resist change that rely at least in part on unconventional 
tactics, and unconventional forms of collective action.”57 
The ability to understand the underlying motivations for social resistance, 
particularly given that recent social movement groups are relying more heavily on digital 
technologies, is important to the study of cyber-enabled UW. Recent uprisings, 
particularly in Tunisia and Egypt, demonstrated an increasing reliance on information age 
technologies to control and coordinate the actions of social movement groups. Through 
this use of technology, revolutionary groups have been able to coordinate to levels that 
have not been seen in previous social movements.58 
There are three factors that influence the appearance and progress of social 
movements: 
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(1) [The] structure of political opportunities and constraints confronting 
the movement; (2) the forms of organization (informal as well as formal), 
available to insurgents; and (3) the collective process of interpretation, 
attribution, and social construction that mediate between opportunity and 
action… [or]…political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing 
processes.59 
The first factor of social movements, political opportunities, are of vital interest to 
the UW community. These opportunities are defined by the state and capitalized upon by 
the counter-state.60 In this way, the state enacts policies that lead to grievances in the 
population, or fails to enforce policies that would prevent grievances. If these erosions of 
the relationship between the state and the population become large enough, it causes the 
state to become vulnerable to insurgent groups. Political opportunities are normally seen 
to arise in state and counter-state conflicts, but transnational and non-state groups can 
also capitalize on these opportunities.61 Growing social connections throughout the 
world, and the ever-increasing speed of communication, contribute to the transnational 
nature of political opportunities. 
How movements organize and mobilize their resources is particularly important 
when considering how to recruit, build, and train resistance organizations in the conduct 
of UW. The second factor significant to the emergence of social movements are 
mobilizing structures. These structures include how an insurgent or resistance group 
organizes itself for the purposes of communicating, gaining and distributing resources, 
obtaining legitimacy, and engaging in collective action to produce political or societal 
change. The mobilizing structures can encompass both informal networks (familial, 
friendship, association, activist, and social media) and formal networks (religious, 
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1996), 41–61. 
 22 
professional, protest groups, and social movements).62 These structures can also be 
divided into networks that directly support, tacitly support, or do not support the goals of 
the social movement. The networks that are developed as a part of mobilization is a major 
contributing factor to the eventual success or failure of the movement..63 
Narratives and guiding principles are critical factors in the formation and 
cultivation of resistance organizations. UW professionals need to be well versed in 
strategic frames as UW networks move from recruitment to operationalization. The third 
factor is strategic framing. It is how movement groups shape the discriminations and 
infringements the state, or other opposition group, committed against the movement into 
a strategic narrative. These statements then become the ideals and principles on which the 
group is based. Moreover, it is how the group mobilizes the political opportunities into 
messages that lead to increased legitimacy, recruitment of new members, and counter-
state activities.64 Simplified further, strategic framing is “the conscious strategic efforts 
by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that 
legitimate and motivate collective action.”65 Additional factors that affect these strategic 
frames that must be considered include the culture in which they are developed and 
mobilized, existing counter-narratives or frames, and the impact of the media on the 
movement’s frame.66 
To further emphasize the relationship between SMT and UW, Lee and Johnson 
identify the relationship between social movements, social revolutions, and UW. They 
state that convergence happens when UW operations focus on organizing existing social 
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movements towards the purpose of subverting or replacing a state, rather than attempting 
to create a new one. This process is inherently easier and cheaper than creating a 
resistance organization from scratch. Unfortunately, this method relies on the pre-
existence of a covert resistance network whose goals align with the objectives of the UW 
campaign.67 
The advent of social media and other information age technologies creates 
additional opportunities to identify covert groups with strategic frames that align with 
U.S. UW objectives prior to taking the risky step of deploying U.S. personnel into a 
hostile country. Identifying either strategic frames or political opportunities in a target 
country can act as a major first step toward developing a viable resistance organization. 
Utilizing digital technologies, SNA can provide critical insights into potential partner 
movements. 
E. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
Networks are everywhere and understanding them is of tantamount importance in 
the conduct of UW. These include very informal networks of friends, family, and even 
distant associates. They also include more formal connections among people, such as 
professional networks and religious networks. These networks can essentially be broken 
down into the individuals and the ties that connect them together.68 In contrast to many 
organizational theories, SNA does not draw a firm distinction between networks and 
hierarchies. Instead, if a group of individuals, and the relationships between them, can be 
represented graphically, it is a network.69 
Understanding and exploiting the relationships between individuals that make up 
resistance networks will enhance the conduct of UW. Network analysis is primarily 
concerned with how ties between individuals affect how the network operates. The 
behavior of the network is not only influenced by direct ties between its members. More 
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distant ties also seem to affect networks. Secondary, tertiary, and relationships out to the 
sixth degree (and even further in some cases) can have profound consequences on how 
the network performs.70 
The underlying forces that bring resistance networks together and influence their 
actions are numerous and often times difficult to understand. SNA offers UW planners a 
tool to gain insight into these social factors that predicate successful counter-state actions. 
As mentioned earlier, SNA is predicated on many different theories to describe how the 
relationships between network members influence the actions and ultimately outcomes of 
the network. These theories are numerous and beyond the scope of this research, but it is 
useful to expound on some key concepts. First, the value that is gained by individuals 
joining a network, as well as the value that is produced by the network is referred to as its 
social capital. Second, trust between network members, including how it is gained and 
maintained, is also an important concept. Next, social influence is how network members 
influence the views, beliefs, and actions of other actors in the network. Similarly, social 
selection seeks to identify how pairs of individuals (or dyads in a social network) are 
drawn together based on common personality traits or behaviors. Finally, diffusion of 
innovation explores how ideas and new technologies are transmitted through networks.71 
Through these theories, SNA seeks to describe and analyze the behavior of the 
complex and varied social networks that exist in our world. Primarily, it does this through 
graphically depicting, or visualizing, networks.72 To do this researchers, or UW 
professionals, first identify the boundaries of a network they want to analyze. Since most 
networks can theatrically expand almost infinitely, this is a critical and important first 
step. Identifying the level of node, or actor, is also important. Networks are often made 
up of individual people, but can also describe the relationships between small groups, 
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large groups, and even nations. Next, the relationships between actors, or their ties, is a 
critical factor.73 Ties can range from direct strong ties to less formal weak ties.74 
Within the social network the distance, or path, between actors is also 
important.75 As mentioned previously, the influence between members that are connected 
by several degrees can have a more profound impact on that network than would be 
intuitively thought.76 The structure, or topography, of the network, particularly how 
dense or sparse the network is and how dependent it is on a small or larger number of 
actors, can reveal a lot about its overall behavior. Within the overall topography of the 
network, subgroups that are connected by strong ties (or cohesive subgroups) can also 
directly influence how the network behaves.77 
Identifying key leaders and influential members of resistance organizations is a 
key task in UW. In most networks, it is clear that some members are more influential than 
others. SNA seeks to identify these members and how central they are to the overall 
network. There are a number of algorithms to identify different types of centrality and 
how they affect the network. Additionally, SNA also seeks to identify key individuals 
that connect the network together. These important actors are referred to as brokers and 
bridges.78 “Bridges are ties that span gaps in a social network, whereas Brokers are those 
actors who sit aside a bridge. Both can be seen as being in a position to control the flow 
of resources through a network.’79 
SNA helps to identify and visualize what makes networks successful. The 
networks of primary concern to UW operate in a covert or clandestine manner. For this 
reason, resistance and insurgent networks are classified as dark networks. Research on 
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dark networks has primarily been focused on how to disrupt them.80 This research, 
however, will focus on identifying factors that will help grow, organize, and eventually 
operationalize counter-state groups. 
F. SOCIAL MOBILIZATION 
The one method of warfare (UW) and three theories (collective action, SNA, and 
SMT) described above are all relevant to understanding social mobilization. From this 
point of view, each theory relates to the internal factors, analysis, or external factors of 
human social or group behavior. Although significant similarity exists, Table 1 displays 
where the elements of each theory relate to the activities examined. 




First, collective action relates to factors that cause an individual to be motivated, 
beyond selfish reasons, to become a part of a communal activity and work toward shared 
goals. The aspects associated with this theory are categorized as internal social 
mobilization factors. Next, SNA is used to understand how actors and ties affect group 
behavior. This is the analysis factor of social mobilization. Finally, SMT seeks to 
understand what external pressures or group motivations cause networks to form in order 
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to seek social or political changes. These features are classified as external social 
mobilization factors. Understanding how each theory interacts is critical to identifying the 
conditions necessary to mobilize resistance groups to conduct unconventional activities. 
There are multiple components within each of the research activities, but as indicated 
in Table 1, there are relationships between these activities, UW as a theory of warfare, and 
the three theories of social mobilization. Because concepts in all the theories overlap, a true 
nexus between all of the social mobilization factors would be difficult to determine. Instead, 
Figure 2 depicts how all of these factors are mutually supporting and should be considered in 
the goal of mobilizing resistance or insurgent networks. 
The figure first depicts cyberspace, and the digital realms that have spawned since 
the dawn of the information age, as the environment that enhances social mobilization. 
The black boxes represent conditions in this environment that improve social 
mobilization in the cyberspace realm. Next, the green triangle represents SMT and the 
external factors that enhance social mobilization. This portion of the figure also places 
the phases of UW with their associated external factors at the corners of the triangle. The 
yellow circle represents the internal processes of social mobilization that improve or help 
understand group behavior. Within this circle, the red text represents collective action and 
the blue text represents SNA. Collective action and SNA factors, previously identified in 
Table 1, are also positioned closest to the external (SMT) factors that they best support. 
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This chapter points out that there is an expansive list of factors that potentially 
facilitate social mobilization, and particularly the utilization of resistance groups. These 
factors represent the conditions that greatly enhance the performance of UW in a perfect, 
theoretical environment. In the real world, it is possible that all of these factors do not 
need to be present for a counter-state group to be successful. Figure 3 shows that cyber-
enabled UW exists in the space at the center of UW, social mobilization, and cyber 
operations. Even if all of the factors shown in Figure 2 are not present, if UW 
professionals can identify, exploit, and even manufacture these conditions it will 
exponentially increase their chance for success. 
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Figure 3 positions cyber-enabled UW at the nexus of UW, social mobilization, 
and cyber operations. Exploiting cyber-platforms can enhance traditional UW techniques 
and become a practical, low cost way for the United States to produce social mobilization 
of counter-state groups. The following chapter will use case studies to identify how these 
theoretical conditions enhanced operations and ultimately led to the successful 
prosecution of cyber-enabled UW-like operations. 
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III. CASE STUDIES 
Four case studies are presented to examine the research activities. The first of 
these case studies is a pre-information age example and is used to determine that UW 
tasks can be successfully completed in the absence of information age technologies. This 
will create a base-line for the UW activities and help to identify what cyber-enabled 
techniques affect the activities used in this research. The other three cases examine how 
state and non-state actors exploit conditions in the cyber domain to execute 
unconventional-like operations. 
A. SERVICE DETACHMENT 101 
Although China, Burma, and India (CBI) formed a secondary theater in the war, 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt considered it of great importance, particularly to support 
the Chinese and keep them in the war against the Japanese. Through the use of UW 
techniques, Detachment 101 was able to identify, recruit, indoctrinate, and operationalize 
indigenous proxy forces for the purposes of intelligence gathering, sabotage, subversion, 
and harassment operations against a numerically superior Japanese enemy. Through these 
proxy forces, DET 101 was able to inflict severe causalities while sustaining minimal 
losses to its own force (the casualty rate was approximately 20:1).81 
This case study of a successful UW organization, operating independent of 
conventional forces, examines the critical activities of recruiting, indoctrinating, training, 
and operationalizing proxy forces prior to the advent of information age technologies. It 
shows that the DET 101 operation in Burma illustrates the techniques and conditions that 
are necessary for the successful execution of UW. Additionally, it provides an example of 
how cyber-enabled techniques may enhance traditional UW operations. 
This section will first present a history of DET 101’s operations in the CBI 
Theater from 1942 to 1945. This sub-section will relate DET 101 operations to the 
                                                 
81 Paddock, US Army Special Warfare; Sacquety, “Organizational Evolution of OSS Detachment 
101.” 
 32 
modern phases of UW. The second sub-section will analyze the UW activities of 
recruiting, indoctrinating, training, and operationalizing proxy forces, to determine how 
DET 101 used tenants of social mobilization, primarily collective action theory and UW 
doctrine, to achieve positive results. Additionally, this sub-section will explore how 
cyber-technologies, if they had been available during WWII, could have enhanced the 
operations and results of this indirect campaign. The final sub-section will offer a 
summary and present a framework analysis figure for this case study. 
1. Background 
In 1937, Japanese military forces invaded China and took control of its ports and 
many major cities. The Japanese pushed forces to the border with India, specifically, they 
garrisoned units and ran operations out of Myitkyina, to restrict all land resupply into 
China. This would hinder the Allies from moving supplies and military aid to General 
Chaing Kai-shek and other Chinese allies. Due to the closed land routes, General Joseph 
Stillwell, the commander of the CBI Theater, was forced to fly supplies over a route 
commonly referred to as the “Hump.” This air route required pilots to fly a treacherous 
pass over the Himalayas. Control of these lines of communication (supply routes) became 
a major theme of all of the campaigns in the CBI Theater. General Stillwell believed that 
reopening land lines of communication, particularly retaking Myitkyina, was critical to 
Allied victory in the theater.82 
General William Donovan, the first head of the OSS, conceived DET 101.83 Its 
original purpose was to act as a clandestine intelligence-gathering organization in the 
Pacific Theater. Organizational infighting and the competing interests of President 
Roosevelt, General Donovan, General Douglas MacArthur, and General Stilwell 
precluded the detachment from conducting operations in MacArthur’s Southeast Asian 
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Theater. This eventually led to DET 101’s assignment to the CBI Theater under the 
command of General Stilwell.84 
Carl Eifler, a young reserve captain, was given command of the detachment. He 
was recommended for the position by General Stilwell, who ironically did not see a need 
for an irregular or unconventional capability in his theater. Eifler was given free rein to 
select personnel for the detachment, train them, and then deploy them to CBI 
headquarters in New Delhi, India. From there, Eifler pushed DET 101 forward into 
Burma and established its headquarters at a tea plantation in Nazira after fully integrating 
his unit and establishing liaison with Stilwell’s CBI staff. The Nazira headquarters would 
act as a base of operations from 1942 to 1945.85 
Between the formation of DET 101 and its headquarters in Nazira, the purpose 
and mission of the unit had changed from intelligence collection to a variety of 
clandestine tasks including sabotage, subversion, espionage, and guerrilla warfare.86 
Although the concept of operational design had not been formalized and named in WWII, 
the DET 101 staff used many of the elements to plan and execute operations.87 Through 
analysis of the tasks and missions given to the unit and liaison with Stilwell’s 
headquarters, it was clear that the Myitkyina area was the Japanese center of gravity. 
Seizing Myitkyina was key to the operational end state of destroying Japanese forces and 
reopening land lines of communication into China. Due to the small size of the unit, DET 
101 planned to execute a decidedly indirect approach in which they would establish an 
intelligence network behind enemy lines; recruit, train, organize, and employ a resistance 
movement; and harass the enemy while simultaneously supporting the efforts of 
conventional forces operating in the theater.88 
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DET 101 engaged in the first phase of modern UW during this timeframe. Eifler, 
Peers, and the DET 101 staff accomplished tasks in this phase by establishing strong 
liaison relationships with CBI headquarters, OSS Washington, and British and Indian 
units currently operating in Burma. By building these relationships, the detachment was 
able to adequately tap into the intelligence and operational networks necessary to prepare 
the theater for the introduction and execution of UW.89 
The detachment was able to achieve a great deal of success during the war, 
despite a resource constrained theater, a confusing chain of command (primarily between 
CBI headquarters and OSS Washington), and a complicated mission  The initial long-
range and short-range penetration missions enabled the detachment to identify a suitable 
proxy force partner in the Kachin tribesmen. Once identified and recruited, the 
detachment set to the task of training this proxy force at their “jungle warfare” school 
which was established at their headquarters in Nazira. Once trained, the Kachins operated 
as an ideal force for the purpose of clandestine intelligence collection. This role expanded 
into sabotage, subversion, and espionage operations. Guerrilla groups of Kachins also 
became adept at executing ambushes and other harassment operations against Japanese 
forces in Burma.90  
The second phase of UW was relatively easy for DET 101 to accomplish because 
many exiled groups were willing to assist allied efforts against the Japanese. The 
detachment previously identified Kachin tribesman as the ideal partner. This enabled the 
transition to the third phase, infiltration of U.S. forces into enemy territory to link-up with 
resistance groups, which DET 101 achieved fairly easy. In fact, phase two and three 
happened close to simultaneously.91 
The fourth phase of UW was primarily conducted through the training and 
organizing of proxy forces at their Nazira “jungle warfare” school. This school was very 
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successful in training the Kachins in advanced communications, clandestine intelligence 
collection, sabotage, subversion, espionage, and tactical skills.92 The skills gained at the 
Nazira facilities resulted in, the fifth phase, build-up of the capacity and capability of 
resistance organizations being easy.93 From 1942 to 1945 the capacity and capability of 
DET 101’s paramilitary forces continued to grow. 
Although early failures of long range penetration operations might indicate 
otherwise, the unit eventually came to understand and plan for the operational reach of 
the Kachins. Several lines of operation also evolved through the campaign. These lines of 
operation ranged from early penetration and recruiting operations to the eventual use of 
guerrilla forces, in a conventional role, against the Japanese in the Shan States. In 
addition, Eifler (and later his successor William Peers) continued to evolve their forces 
and functions through a constant negotiation with CBI headquarters and OSS 
Washington. By the end of the war the unit had functioning administrative, training, 
operations, moral operations (predecessor to psychological operations), intelligence, and 
counter-intelligence sections and capabilities.94 
During the sixth phase of UW, DET 101 successfully employed proxy guerrilla 
fighters until the end of the active opposition in Burma (approximately 1945). From 1942 
to 1945, the detachment conducted UW operations against the Japanese in the CBI 
Theater. The most highly publicized operation that occurred during this period was the 
detachment’s support to Merrill’s Marauders (5307th Composite Unit, code named 
“Galahad”) in its operation to infiltrate and seize Myitkyina. DET 101’s paramilitary 
forces would act as guides and scouts to “Galahad.” In addition, they would screen the 
movements of the force as it conducted its infiltration and exfiltration from the objective. 
Despite heavy losses, Merrill’s Marauders were successful in recapturing Myitkyina from 
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the Japanese. This success is due, in no small part, to the contributions of DET 101 
during the operation.95 
On the other side of the spectrum, the detachment saw the least amount of success 
when its forces were used in a conventional role toward the end of the war. Following the 
success of retaking Myitkyina in support of “Galahad,” the detachment received a 
directive to swell the ranks of its paramilitary to 10,000 guerrilla proxy forces. This led 
the detachment to be used in a conventional role when it was ordered to clear Japanese 
forces from the Shan States. Though eventually successful, DET 101’s guerrilla forces 
would take more casualties during this operation than any other point in the campaign.96 
Shortly after operations in the Shan State, active conflict in the CBI Theater ended and 
the detachment transitioned to the final phase of UW by standing down their proxy and 
guerrilla forces. 
By the end of the war, DET 101 inflicted an estimated 10,000 casualties (killed or 
seriously injured) on the Japanese, while only suffering several hundred of their own. 
Additionally, they destroyed hundreds of bridges, trains, and military vehicles through 
their sabotage operations. Perhaps most impressive, the detachment provided a vast 
majority of the actionable intelligence used in the CBI Theater. Some estimates state that 
over 80% of Air Force targets in the theater were selected based on intelligence provided 
by DET 101.97 
2. Operations 
Examining the DET 101 case study in Burma reveals that conditions in occupied 
China, Burma, and India provided an ideal situation for group behavior social 
mobilization. Social mobilization theories seek to explain why individuals establish 
groups and organizations for common causes. Of particular interest to this research is the 
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“start-up problem” and what motivates individuals to move past selfish motivation and 
engage in collective behavior.98 
The Japanese occupation created a social dilemma causing otherwise unconnected 
groups of people to band together for a common purpose.99 Additionally, the Japanese 
were not benevolent occupiers. Harsh treatment of locals gave additional motivation for 
otherwise disconnected groups to overcome the cost of punishment (capture, torture, or 
even death) to band together in resistance organizations.100 Collective action calls this 
cost and benefit equation as the “start-up problem,” in which individuals overlook the 
costs (risks to life or family) for the benefits they will receive (freedom from oppressive 
occupiers).101 
Conditions created by the Japanese made the job of recruiting resistance, proxy, 
and guerrilla forces relatively simple for DET 101 personnel. As previously stated, there 
were many potential groups of people in the CBI Theater that the detachment could have 
chosen as a partner force. Additional factors made recruitment of Kachins the ideal 
choice. First, they were a minority group that was subjugated by the British colonial 
authority prior to Japanese occupation. Second, due to colonial exploitation, they were 
regularly pitted against other ethnic groups in the area causing their group to be tightly 
knit. Third, they did not see the Americans as colonial occupiers or as an oppressive 
group. Finally, they were already formed into unorganized resistance groups prior to DET 
101’s arrival.102 These factors made large-scale recruitment an attainable goal for DET 
101. 
                                                 
98 Centola, “Homophily, Networks, and Critical Mass;” Olson, Logic of Collective Action; Ostrom, 
“Behavioral Approach;” Ostrom, “Analyzing Collective Action;” Ostrom, “Collective Action and the 
Evolution.” 
99 Ostrom, “Behavioral Approach.” 
100 Sacquety, “Organizational Evolution of OSS Detachment 101;” Wenner, “Detachment 101 in the 
CBI.” 
101 Centola, “Homophily, Networks, and Critical Mass;” Olson, Logic of Collective Action; Ostrom, 
“Behavioral Approach;” Ostrom, “Analyzing Collective Action;” Ostrom, “Collective Action and the 
Evolution.” 
102 Sacquety, “Organizational Evolution of OSS Detachment 101,” 26–29. 
 38 
Information age technologies, particularly the Internet, could make the job of 
recruitment even easier. First, advanced communication, offered by the Internet, could 
reduce the risks to DET 101 by eliminating the need to immediately conduct physical 
infiltration into Japanese occupied territory to identify potential resistance groups. Social 
media could provide a platform to interact with potential resistance and guerrilla 
membership. Additionally, the detachment could exploit social network analysis (SNA) 
tools to gain additional insights into fledgling resistance groups, including which 
members are more central to an organization, authority figures, and members who broker 
social capital (or provide connections between groups).103 
In a state and counter-state conflict, indoctrination of resistance groups is a major 
factor. In this case, it was not a major concern to DET 101 forces. At the time of initial 
contact, the detachment found a group that was already resolutely anti-Japanese and pro-
Ally.104 Although cultural and language barriers needed to be overcome, war-time 
conditions provided an environment where indoctrination became a minor factor. 
Even though indoctrination was not a major activity for DET 101, advanced 
Internet communications platforms would have provided a distinct advantage to a force 
wishing to proselytize a proxy group. SNA could have provided the visibility necessary 
to insert information through members of the network most likely to propagate material 
throughout the entire network.105 Once again, this would have alleviated the need for UW 
practitioners to physically infiltrate areas, early in the UW operation to establish and 
maintain conditions necessary for the morale and desired mindset of resistance forces. 
The jungle environment of Burma provided an excellent base for training and 
operationalizing guerrilla forces. As previously discussed, DET 101 established and 
operated a robust training facility at their Nazira headquarters. At the “jungle warfare” 
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school, the detachment was able to train the Kachin in a wide variety of skills including 
communications, clandestine intelligence collection, sabotage, and advanced guerrilla 
tactics. Although forward based were established (Operation “Forward” and 
“Knothead”), the Nazira base also afforded the detachment an ideal location from which 
to launch operations resistance forces.106 
Training of UW forces is difficult to conduct or enhance in a digital or Internet 
environment. Although it is difficult, it is not entirely impossible. UW practitioners can 
learn lessons by studying terrorist organizations. Terrorists use the Internet to post 
materials giving detailed instructions on subjects ranging from how to build bombs to 
kidnapping Americans. Capitalizing on even more advanced technologies, the terrorist-
affiliated organization Hizballah designed and disseminated a video game giving players 
the ability to conduct missions against Israeli soldiers.107 Advances in virtual reality (VR) 
training and the decreasing costs of VR hardware can also potentially be exploited in 
future UW scenarios.108 
Training forces in the digital environment is a fairly new requirement. 
Information and cyber technologies could have enhanced DET 101’s Moral Operations 
(psychological operations) and also allowed them to attack enemy communications and 
other critical infrastructures. Inevitably, operationalization of forces is the UW activity 
where the barrier between the digital and physical world must be breeched. Cyber-
enabled operations have the potential to remove that barrier, therefore reducing the risks 
that must be taken by UW operators. 
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3. Summary 
This case study provides an excellent example of how successful UW can produce 
strategic effects in war. Many factors including leadership of the unit; organizing and 
training of DET 101 personnel; and factors in the operational environment led to the 
successful recruitment, indoctrination, training, and operationalizing of competent and 
effective guerrilla forces. Through examination of U.S. doctrine for UW, it is clear that 
current techniques and procedures are a direct reflection of this historical case. As such, 
this example reflects the seven phases of contemporary U.S. doctrine for UW. 
DET 101 also exploited conditions in the operational environment that were 
conducive to social mobilization. The “start-up problem” was easily overcome, creating 
an ideal environment for the initial recruitment and indoctrination of indigenous 
personnel. It is evident that information age technologies, particularly those provided 
through SNA tools could have facilitated activities in the four areas examined: 
recruitment, indoctrination, training, and operationalizing resistance and guerrilla forces. 
This case study will be the only one examined in the pre-information age environment. 
Conditions that enhanced Detachment 101’s social mobilization during the UW 
operation in Burma that fall within the four areas of activity are highlighted in the 
analysis framework shown in Figure 4. 
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B. RUSSIA VERSUS GEORGIA: THE SOUTH OSSETIA CAMPAIGN 
The Cold War ended in 1991. To the relief of many, this happened not with the 
flash of nuclear Armageddon, but instead with a drastic shift in the policy of the Soviet 
Union under Mikhail Gorbachev. This transformation from a tense bi-polar world to a 
multi-polar one (with only a single-super power remaining), ushered in a new era, 
particularly for countries in Eastern Europe. This new system allowed the small Republic 
of Georgia to break away from their former host country.109 
Following the collapse of the United Soviet Socialist Republic (U.S.S.R.), U.S. 
diplomatic, intelligence, and military agencies changed their focus from Communism, 
and the threat of World War III, to the growing threat of terrorism. Along these same 
lines, the hub of the U.S. intelligence apparatus (the Central Intelligence Agency or CIA), 
under the George H.W. Bush administration, reorganized its efforts to combat 
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“transnational issues” including terrorism, drugs, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, and crime.110 The terrorist attacks against the U.S. on September 11, 2001 
validated these new lines of operation. 
After 9/11, the Russians also acknowledged terrorism to be of chief concern. With 
this common enemy, an unlikely partnership between U.S. and Russian political and 
intelligence agencies emerged.111 This new “friendly” relationship between former rivals 
from East and West, made Russian military aggression against Georgia (a North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) applicant country) in 2008 seem unlikely. On the contrary, 
the war between Russia and Georgia was the product of a deliberate policy of overt and 
covert actions to destabilize and eventually retake former Russian diaspora regions in 
Georgia.112 Although the United States was not directly involved in this conflict, there is 
much U.S. UW and intelligence professionals can learn from Russia’s success, 
particularly the use of covert cyber operations to enable both conventional and special 
operations forces. 
This section asserts that Russia used the Georgian conflict to test new cyber-
enabled UW, cyber-attack, and cyber-propaganda, to support the deployment of its 
conventional military forces. To reach this conclusion, the first sub-section discusses 
Russian political, military, and intelligence doctrine. This sub-section also presents a 
history of the 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia. The second sub-section 
analyzes the UW activities (recruiting, indoctrinating, training, and operationalizing 
proxy forces) and how Russian forces used aspects of social mobilization in support of 
their campaign in South Ossetia. This sub-section also explores how Information Age 
technologies enhanced Russian operations. The final sub-section summarizes and 
presents a framework analysis summary of the case-study. 
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This section will be split into two parts. The first part will explain Russian 
information, intelligence, and warfare doctrine. The second section will describe the 2009 
conflict between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia. 
a. The Evolution of Russian Warfare
Russia recognizes that information warfare is crucial for destabilizing the West 
and regaining control of the ethnically Russian Diasporas.113 Spetspropaganda (special 
propaganda) was re-introduced in 2000, and has since been taught to specialists in 
Russian military and intelligence services. Of particular interest, Russian information 
warfare doctrine includes and integrates cyber techniques into special propaganda.114 
To further emphasize this key factor, top Russian military leader, Valery 
Gerasimov, authored an article titled “The New Generation Warfare,” which documents 
Russia’s intent of destabilizing and manipulating countries in the information space prior 
to the incursion of special operations or conventional military forces. This article lays out 
Russian military and intelligence doctrine and how it relies on digital and information 
technologies to execute covert and clandestine information programs to influence 
targeted populations (government, military, and civilian).115 Current Russian strategy 
was developed using old Soviet ideas and tested on modern battlefields. 
Digital information and cyber warfare techniques were successfully tested, on a 
limited scale, in Estonia in 2007. One year later, during the South Ossetia conflict, Russia 
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was much more successful in the cyber realm by combining cyber activities in support of 
overt military actions.116 
b. Russia versus Georgia: Cyber Proxy War
The tension between Russia and Georgia over the South Ossetia region did not 
start in 2008. The two countries had been in a state of low level conflict, which has often 
resulted in violence between opposing ethnic groups since the early twentieth century. 
After the collapse of the U.S.S.R., the ethnically Russian regions of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia demanded sovereignty from the Georgian government. To add to this problem, 
and to begin setting the stage for future action, Russia exploited these minority regions by 
offering Russian citizenship to any person who resided in a previously Soviet controlled 
area. In this way they were able to intervene into the affairs of these countries under the 
auspices of aiding their citizens.117 
The issue of re-integrating breakaway regions continued through the 1990s and 
well into the first decade of the new millennium.118 The eventual conflict in 2008 was set 
into motion following “[the] Rose Revolution of November 2003, together with the 
subsequent election of Mikhail Saakasvilli in 2004, [reigniting] Georgian nationalist 
sentiment.”119 The Saakasvilli government pursued a campaign to re-integrate the South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia regions. Relations between the Russian Federation and Georgia 
deteriorated even more after NATO officially recognized Kosovo in 2008 and Georgia 
continued to pursue NATO membership.120 
The conflict officially began on August 8, 2008, when Russian forces crossed the 
border into South Ossetia. Although Russia asserted that the movement of troops was to 
reinforce their peace keeping operation in the area, the Georgian Government saw this 
aggression as reason to declare war and began shelling the South Ossetia capital of 
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Tskhinvalli.121 Russia deployed naval, air, and ground forces to participate in the 
conflict. The more heavily equipped Russian forces, in support of South Ossetia militia, 
were able to defeat the lighter armed Georgian troops. 
Despite the long and deeply rooted disagreements that fueled this conflict, major 
combat operations were not spectacular and the war only lasted for five days. Arguably, 
the more interesting part of this contest happened on the cyber battlefield and originated 
from servers and computers located within Russian sovereign territory.122 The Georgian 
government started to recognize cyber-attacks several weeks before the deployment of 
Russian forces. The volume, sophistication, and intensity of cyber-based operations 
continued to increase through the end of the conflict. These attacks targeted government, 
media, and economic sites, negatively affecting the Georgian government’s ability to 
communicate with its population at a time of crisis and uncertainty.123 
Russian hackers achieved this effect by using a relatively simple technique known 
as a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. By pushing too much data to a computer, 
site, or server, these types of attacks effectively prevent “legitimate” users from accessing 
information technology resources.124 The DDoS attacks were so effective in limiting the 
Georgian government’s ability to communicate through Internet resources, it forced them 
to relocate critical servers to locations outside of the country (particularly in the United 
States and Estonia).125 
In addition to DDoS attacks, Russian hackers also conducted cyber-propaganda 
operations intended to sway local Georgian and international opinion. Hackers 
disseminated web-propaganda through “[Structured Query Language (SQL)] [injections], 
which [use] a test field on a webpage to directly communicate with the back end database 
(normally, a common SQL database—hence the name).”126 The most commonly cited of 
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these propaganda attacks was when the website of the Georgian government was defaced 
and embedded with an image comparing President Saakashvili to Hitler.127 
In the conflict with Georgia, Russia categorically denies involvement in the cyber 
domain. Instead they assert that the actions were organized and executed by patriotic 
citizens (most likely Russian government proxies). A Russian military official even 
reversed the blame stating that the attacks were “a response to Georgians hacking South 
Ossetia media sites earlier in the week.”128 This demonstrated act of plausible deniability 
is the first aspect that lends credence to the assertion that Russian political, military, and 
intelligence services helped to orchestrate cyber-enabled operations in the South Ossetia 
conflict. 
Despite Russia’s denial of their involvement, the Georgian government and 
multiple international journalists assert that Russians were responsible for cyber 
operations during the war.129 Several reasons are given for making this connection. First, 
the timing of the cyber-attacks, particularly the DDoS attacks, were said to have been 
synchronized too well with the introduction of conventional military forces to have 
happened by chance. This suggested that the parties responsible at least received 
information and possibly instructions from elements in the Russian government and 
intelligence services. Second, the key government, economic, and infrastructure sites 
targeted in cyberspace were not the same as the targets of Russian ground troops. This 
suggested that the Russian military understood the effects that cyber-attacks would have 
and did not waste resources in a duplication of efforts.130 
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2. Operations 
The 2008 conflict between Georgia and Russia provides an example where factors 
in the operational environment provided conditions for the synthesis of group behavior or 
social mobilization.131 Russian forces exploited factors in the environment to lower the 
costs of participating in this proxy-cyber network. This helped with the initial tasks of 
recruiting and indoctrinating a cyber-enabled counter-state network. 
First, it is important to re-emphasize that the majority of South Ossetia citizens 
are ethnically similar and consider themselves to be a part of the Russian diaspora.132 
Inherent to the tasks of recruiting and indoctrinating cyber-proxy forces is Russia’s belief 
that “information battles are necessary for the Russian and Eurasian civilization to 
counteract informational aggression from the Atlantic civilization led by the USA.”133 
This belief is derived from Russian academic, political, and military doctrine. These 
convictions are indoctrinated into all members of the Russian-speaking diaspora from a 
young age through state controlled media outlets. From this position, the legitimate 
annexation of all of the culturally Russian diaspora regions is seen as a patriotic duty.134 
The digital environment, in which the Russian cyber proxy forces operate, also 
reduces barriers that may otherwise inhibit potential members from joining during a 
turbulent crisis in South Ossetia. These key factors include a low cost of entry, sparse 
regulations by national and international organizations, anonymity and secrecy provided 
to members, the speed of information, and a wide variety of available multimedia.135 
Training and operationalizing forces for the cyber-battlefield did not fall directly 
on the shoulders of Russian military or political leaders. According to Franke Ulrik’s 
extensive report on Russian non-kinetic tactics, Moscow feels that plausible deniability of 
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covert cyber campaigns is desirable. This leads Russian agents to use proxies and “go-
betweens” to facilitate operations on the cyber battlefield.136 Exactly how this was 
accomplished in the Ossetia campaign, and by what proxies, has not been publically 
acknowledged by the Russian government, but the use of these techniques are called for 
in Russian political and military doctrine.137 
One proxy that was used is the Russian Business Network (RBN). The RBN is an 
organized criminal group that claimed a degree of responsibility for cyber-operations 
during the 2008 conflict. The RBN helped organize and recruit hackers for this effort and 
additionally supplied advanced software and hacking techniques to these so-called “cyber 
militias.”138 This lends further credence to the theory that the cyber portion of this 
campaign was a covert UW-like effort. 
It is also reasonable to assert that the Russian government recruited, 
synchronized, and operationalized these proxy forces to support its military objectives. 
The use of proxy forces also allowed the Russian Federation to continue denial of these 
actions despite what some journalists and scholars assert is irrefutable evidence to the 
contrary.139 
These factors significantly lowered the risks associated with social mobilization 
and allowed Russian forces to recruit, indoctrinate, train, and operationalize a proxy 
cyber force that enhanced the results obtained by their conventional and special 
operations forces. Additionally, Information Age technologies, principally the Internet, 
made the job of recruiting even easier. Advanced communication, offered by the Internet, 
reduced the risks to Russian agents by eliminating the need to conduct an immediate 
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physical infiltration into South Ossetia. This also provided an additional layer between 
the Russian government and their proxy cyber force. This separation helped Moscow to 
maintain plausible deniability with regard to their operations in the cyber domain. 
Although there is no direct evidence that Russia used Social Network Analysis 
(SNA) in the conflict with Georgia, SNA software could have been used to gain insights 
into potential proxy forces. These insights include which members are more central to an 
organization, which are authority figures, and which bridge social capital (or provide 
connections between groups).140 The use of SNA could also provide the visibility 
necessary to insert information through members most likely to propagate material 
throughout the entire network.141 Once again, this would alleviate the need for Russian 
government agents to physically infiltrate (early in the operation) to establish and 
maintain conditions necessary for the morale and desired mindset of proxy forces. 
Training of proxy forces is difficult in a digital or Internet environment. During 
this crisis, the RBN and Russian “hacking” forums provided information on advanced 
cyber warfare techniques. Additionally, Russian information warfare doctrine stresses the 
need to integrate cyber and physical warfare. It also encourages the use of digital 
technologies in modern operations.142 Although not seen in this conflict, the decreasing 
costs of virtual reality hardware will inevitably become a tool for the training of future 
digital warriors.143 
Operationalizing forces in the digital environment is a fairly new occurrence. 
Information age technologies enhanced Russian spetspropaganda (psychological and 
deception operations) and cyber-attack capabilities in the digital environment, allowing 
them to attack enemy communications and other critical infrastructures. Inevitably, 
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operationalization of forces is the activity where the barrier between the digital and 
physical world must be breached. These cyber-enabled unconventional operations 
potentially moved that barrier to the digital side, therefore reducing the risks that had to 
be taken by Russian military and intelligence service agents. 
3. Summary 
The campaign in cyberspace against Georgia was used to destabilize and 
influence the physical environment in an UW-like fashion. Since this campaign was 
executed by proxy forces, Russian authorities have been able to continue to deny 
involvement. This denial and use of proxies provides credibility to the theory that cyber-
attacks and cyber propaganda were a deliberate unconventional operation. Although it is 
unlikely that the Russian government will disclose its involvement in these cyber-attacks 
anytime in the near future, it is clear that Russian intelligence and military leadership 
used lessons learned during their 2008 incursion in Georgia to develop their current 
Information Warfare doctrine.144 
In the future, Russia may continue incursions into the sovereign territory of other 
state actors to support the ethnically Russian diaspora. The Georgian case study shows 
that, even seven years ago, Russia was developing and building refined covert 
information warfare capability and capacity to enhance their ability to recruit, 
indoctrinate, train, and operationalize proxy forces. Their new military and political 
doctrine confirms that these cyber techniques will continue to be a factor in how they 
achieve their national strategic goals. Lessons from this case study, including how proxy 
cyber forces influenced and set conditions for conventional and special operations, have 
the potential to be applied when rethinking future U.S. UW doctrine. 
In the 2008 conflict, Russia achieved many of its goals. It also learned valuable 
lessons for use in its future campaigns. U.S. policy makers and UW professionals can 
gain valuable insights from analysis of the techniques used in the cyber-portion of this 
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conflict. Capitalizing on these successful methods to structure U.S. understanding of 
cyber-enabled UW will open up new low-cost, low-footprint options for future conflicts. 
The factors that enhanced Russia’s social mobilization during the unconventional 
warfare operation in South Ossetia that fall within the four areas of activity are 
highlighted in Figure 5. 




C. RUSSIA VERSUS UKRAINE: THE CRIMEA ANNEXATION 
This case study is relevant because it represents a recent use of UW by a state 
actor, Russia. The UW operation was a stunning success and showed a dramatic 
capability increase when compared to their 2008 operation in South Ossetia. As was 
demonstrated in the South Ossetia Campaign, the conditions for social mobilization were 
ideal and Russia exploited these same conditions with the Crimea annexation. This case 
study will identify how Russia conducted a UW operation by blending real world 
paramilitary operations with cyber-enabled capabilities, resulting in the annexation of 
Crimea. The case study will start with a brief history of Crimea followed by the events 
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leading up to Russia’s UW operation. Next, the case study will focus on Russia’s UW 
operation, broken down into five broad topic categories: paramilitary operations, cyber 
warfare, deception, propaganda, and policy. The case study will then describe the social 
mobilization factors that led to Russia’s successful UW operation in regard to the 
selected categories of recruitment, indoctrination, training and operations.  
Over the course of approximately a month between February and March 2014, 
Russia annexed sovereign Ukrainian territory and stirred fears of a new Cold War. In 
early February 2014, with the pro-Russian Ukrainian government losing control and 
falling later that month, Russia planned and executed an unconventional warfare 
operation to annex Crimea.145 Paramount to the success of this operation was Russia’s 
use of cyberspace operations during the entire spectrum of the UW operation. 
1. Background 
The background of this case will be broken into two parts. The first part will 
describe the historical background of Russia’s relationship with the Crimean region. The 
second part will describe the events that led to the annexation of the Crimea by the 
Russian Federation. 
a. Crimea’s Russian History 
Crimea has a long historical affiliation with Russia dating back to the late 1700s 
when it was first annexed by the Russian empire for its port at Sevastopol.146 During the 
reign of the Soviet Union, the control of Crimea was transferred to Ukraine by then First 
Secretary of the Communist Party Nikita Khrushchev and was the homeport of the Black 
Sea Fleet (currently territory of the U.S.S.R.).147 With the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Ukraine became independent in 1991 and Crimea was recognized as an autonomous 
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republic inside Ukraine with a majority of Crimeans identifying themselves as Russian.148 
In 1997, the Partition Treaty signed between Russia and Ukraine split the Black Sea Fleet 
with 81.7% of the vessels going to Russia and allowing Russia long-term use of the navy 
port facilities in Sevastopol.149 
b. The Events Leading to Russia’s Unconventional Operation 
Ukraine has historically fallen within the Russian sphere of influence and more 
recently within Russia’s “near abroad.” It occupies a strategic position between the 
European Union and NATO member states on one side and Russia with its Black Sea 
Fleet based in Crimea on the other. Since the end of the Cold War both sides have 
attempted to influence Ukraine to join their respective spheres of influence and it 
appeared Ukraine was leaning towards the west until November 2013.  
At the last-minute in November 2013, Ukrainian President Yanukovych decided 
to scrap an economic trade deal with the European Union because of pressure from the 
Russian government.150  Massive anti-government protests broke out in Kiev, the capital 
of Ukraine, that lasted for three months alternating between violent and peaceful actions. 
On February 18, 2013, by the orders of President Yanukovych, elite Ukrainian riot police 
known as “Berkut” broke the protest through the use of deadly force, using snipers and 
hired government thugs, resulting in the death of over 100 people and hundreds more 
injured.151 Over the next few days the Parliament acted, disbanding the Berkut, ordering 
police and military forces back to their bases and causing President Yanukovych and his 
top officials to flee the country to Russia as they were branded wanted criminals.152 
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Protesters seized key government buildings in Kiev and on February 27, a new pro-
Western government was formed by the Ukrainian Parliament.153 
2. Operations 
Russian intelligence activities and preparations for UW within Crimea appear to 
have begun early during the crisis in Kiev. This involvement was due to Crimea’s 
strategic position, historical ties, and status as home to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, which 
hosts approximately 11,000 Russian navy and support personnel. Russian intelligence 
services “thoroughly penetrated” the Ukrainian military, police, and intelligence 
services.154 Additionally, according to Langton, Director of Independent Conflict 
Research and Analysis in London, Russia conducted extensive work prior to the conflict 
by training and organizing “small local units among Crimea’s ethnic Russians that could 
be activated in times of tension.”155 
With the world’s attention focused on the Winter Olympics in Sochi, the Russian 
government quietly increased its UW activities in Crimea. By early February 2014, mass 
rallies were organized in Crimea by pro-Russian political parties, which included a 
protest in Sevastopol of 50,000 people.156 During this time Russian entities in Crimea 
started “recruiting local self-defense forces” from the organized rallies, with the 
recruitment numbering upwards of 10,000 individuals.157 These conditions allowed 
Russia to establish the mobilization structures required within collective action that 
directly assisted with the UW operation.  
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a. Paramilitary Operations 
The main thrust of Russia’s UW operation took place within the area of 
paramilitary operations after the pro-Russian Ukrainian President Yanukovych fled and 
the Ukrainian Parliament appeared to pivot away from Russia and toward the West. 
Paramilitary operations involve using some sort of unconventional or special operations 
force to conduct actions that may require the “use of force” or to train individuals to 
conduct such operations.158 
On February 26, 2014, elite Russian Special Forces, GRU Spetsnaz commandos 
(from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces), and 
airborne unit personnel deployed to Crimea via Black Sea Fleet vessels and Mi-24 
helicopters. Russia essentially moved a Trojan Horse into Crimea through their ports.159 
This paramilitary force wore brand new green uniforms, black ski masks, and no rank or 
insignia; they were dubbed the “little green men.”160 The Russian paramilitary force 
surrounded key Ukrainian government facilities in Crimea, including military bases 
containing 18,000 Ukrainian military personnel, airports and local Crimean government 
buildings.161 The Russian navy also participated forming a blockade of Crimea in the 
Black Sea, which prevented Ukraine’s navy from reacting to the events in Crimea.162 
Over the next few days, Russian forces seized “control of Crimea’s airspace, its 
ports, its highways, its television stations, and is regional government.”163 Russia seized 
an eastern Crimea port across from the Russian Kuban region and began moving 
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paramilitary forces and vehicles by ferry across the strait.164 Russia deployed a total of 
approximately 6,000 to 7,000 “little green men” by ship and air into Crimea.165 Within 
the paramilitary force, the Russian government employed the use of private Russian 
security firm personnel. These individuals seized the Crimean Parliament building, the 
Verkhovna Rada, and wore a distinctively different military type uniform.166 The 
paramilitary forces specifically targeted and seized local police stations and other 
government buildings that had weapons and ammunition supplies so they could be turned 
over to local Russian-backed forces.167 
Unarmed Crimeans even “helped the Russian forces by surrounding Ukrainian 
military bases…making it very difficult for Ukrainian troops to even think about opening 
fire” or attempt to use force to resist the Russian actions.168 The Russian paramilitary 
forces did not encounter any resistance from the Ukrainian military and security 
personnel and seized Crimea without firing a shot. 
b. Cyber Warfare 
As its paramilitary forces entered Crimea, Russia used cyber warfare to jam cell 
phone and Internet communications in order to knock off-line and sever the Ukrainian 
military command and control between units stationed in Crimea and their headquarters 
in Kiev.169 “Massive denial-of-service attack[s]” were conducted against Ukrainian 
military and security services, which knocked out their Internet servers, severing their 
command and control capabilities.170 The Ukrainian state-owned telecommunications 
company Ukrtelecom, which provided Internet and phone service to Crimea, reported 
their telecommunications infrastructure in Crimea had been degraded and they were 
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unable to restore service.171 The InfoSec Institute released a report further detailing the 
Russian use of cyber warfare to isolate Crimea from the rest of Ukraine and specifically 
discussed how multiple Crimean government websites were shut down during the UW 
operation.172 
c. Deception Operations 
Russia executed a series of successful deception operations within the first few 
days of the UW operation, though they were only thinly veiled as the action progressed. 
These operations were undertaken to present a false reality to a specific audience through 
manipulation and distortion.173 
To dissuade Ukraine and any other country or alliance such as NATO from 
interfering with the Russian UW operation, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu 
announced a surprise military exercise consisting of 150,000 Russian troops with 40,000 
of them on the border with Ukraine.174 Under the guise of protecting Russian Black Sea 
Fleet personnel, the Russian Foreign Ministry informed the Ukrainian government and 
posted on its website that it was moving Black Sea Fleet troops between its bases in 
Crimea using armored personnel carriers and helicopters all “in full accordance with the 
foundation Russian-Ukrainian agreement on the Black Sea Fleet.”175 Additionally, 
throughout the UW operation President Putin continuously denied any Russian forces 
were involved and on March 4, 2014, stated the movement of Russian troops throughout 
Crimea were only involved with the “protection of our [Black Sea Fleet] installations” 
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even as the evidence mounted to show otherwise.176 In reality, the Russians used 
President Putin’s denials, the exercise and the guise of protecting its Black Sea Fleet 
personnel to move paramilitary forces into Crimea. 
d. Propaganda 
As soon as the UW operation began, Russian news and media outlets were 
employed to push the narrative that Russia needed to intervene “to rescue the Russian-
speaking population from right-wing extremists and chaos” targeting both the Russian 
domestic and larger international audiences with the multilingual Russia Today (RT) 
news channel leading the charge.177 
The Russian propaganda operation also created online “troll armies” to leverage 
social networks, via social media platforms, consisting of individuals and at least one 
company.178 These “trolls” were paid to manage numerous fake user profiles and 
accounts, to tweet, post, and blog simple pro-Russian stories and opinions approximately 
50 times a day.179 The use of social media platforms by “troll armies” and other entities 
assisted within the conditions required of social mobilization because it significantly 
decreased the cost of participation and risk by those actors.  
In a carefully planned announcement made via Facebook to look like a reaction to 
spontaneous unfolding events, the Consul General of the Russian Federation in 
Simferopol “began handing out Russian passports to soldiers of the Berkut detachment,” 
the notorious riot police that had been disbanded by the Ukrainian government for 
shooting protesters in Kiev, under the pretense of the need to protect the Russian-
speaking population.180 At the same time, the Crimean Parliament which was under the 
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control of the Russian paramilitary forces “announced the formation of a Crimean Berkut 
special division to protect public order” as a way to legitimize the UW paramilitary 
force.181 
e. Overt Policy 
Throughout the UW operation in Crimea, although President Putin denied 
Russian involvement, Putin and his government continued to make statements asserting 
Russia’s rights as they pertained to Crimea. Some of these included Russia’s right to 
protect its Black Sea Fleet personnel and property, protect the Russian-speaking 
population and Russian citizens of Crimea from violence as is stated in the Russian 
Constitution, and that a humanitarian crisis was at its border.182 
On March 1, 2014, with the world still trying to figure out who the “little green 
men” were, President Putin made a request to the Russian Parliament for “the use of the 
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine for the normalization 
of the political situation in this country.”183 The Russian Parliament approved it. By mid-
March 2014, Crimean residents held a referendum to secede from Ukraine with “97% of 
voters back[ing] a proposal to join Russia,” according to The Washington Post.184 On 
March 18, 2014, President Putin signed a treaty officially annexing Crimea and in April, 
President Putin admitted that Russian military forces were involved with the UW 
operation in Crimea.185 
3. Summary 
Russia combined both physical and virtual UW operations, resulting in a stunning 
success. While the world was attempting to figure out who the “little green men” were, 
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Russia annexed the territory of another country without firing a shot. Russia’s successful UW 
operation redrew the maps of Europe bringing Crimea within Russia’s sphere of influence.  
Several underlying social mobilization factors assisted Russia in their successful 
annexation of Crimea. First and foremost was the shared common history between 
Crimea and Russia and the fact that a majority of Crimeans self-identified as Russians 
immediately prior to the UW operation. As discussed in Chapter 2, the turmoil unfolding in 
the Ukraine capital of Kiev provided Russia with a political opportunity to frame the crisis 
as requiring Russian action to protect their military personnel and Russian-speaking people 
in Crimea. Russia had already laid the groundwork for mobilizing structures prior to the 
UW operation by training and organizing local resistance units and using the Crimean pro-
Russian political parties to organize mass protests against the Ukrainian government. 
Russia masterfully used Internet technologies to push its narrative of events and deceive the 
world long enough to launch its UW operation. With the UW operation underway, Russia 
employed a paramilitary force on the ground in Crimea and enhanced their operation by 
conducting cyberspace operations, annexing Crimea without firing a shot. 
The factors that enhanced Russia’s social mobilization during the unconventional 
warfare operation in Crimea that fall within the four selected categories from this case 
study are highlighted in the analysis framework shown in Figure 6. Although many of 
these factors are not inherently cyber operations, they all support the Russian’s cyber 
campaign in Crimea. 
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D. NON-STATE ACTORS 
This case is distinct because it specifically deals with non-state actors’ use of 
cyberspace operations to enhance their recruitment, indoctrination, training and 
operations in UW-like campaigns that are still ongoing. The other case studies focused on 
state actors within a specific timeframe where the UW-like campaigns have drawn to a 
close. This case study will identify how two non-state actors, specifically al-Suri, who 
was a member of Al-Qaida, and the Al-Qaida offshoot, Islamic State, have and continue 
to use cyberspace operations in furtherance of their objectives. The case study will start 
by detailing Al-Suri’s life, outlining his jihadi unconventional warfare framework put 
forth in the Global Islamic Resistance Call, and discussing how Al-Suri used cyberspace 
to enhance the global jihadi movement through collective action. The case will focus on 
how Islamic State has successfully employed Al-Suri’s framework using cyberspace 
operations with regard to the selected categories of recruitment, indoctrination, training 
and operations.  
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On January 9, 2015, Amedy Coulibaly barricaded himself inside a kosher 
supermarket in Paris, France and executed four Jewish patrons before being killed by 
Paris police.186 On May 4, 2015, Elton Simpson and Nadir Soofi opened fire at a cartoon 
exhibit of the Prophet Muhammad in Garland, Texas, where they were both killed by 
Texas police.187 On June 2, 2015, Usaama Rahim was shot and killed near Boston, 
Massachusetts, when he pulled a military-style knife on a Boston Police officer and 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) special agent who had approached him to question 
him in regard to a plot to behead a police officer.188 The link between these three events 
is that the individuals involved were conducting terrorist operations on behalf of Islamic 
State, even though they had never physically met with it. These individuals’ only contact 
with Islamic State was virtual, through cyberspace.  
The events outlined above are the full realization of Al-Suri’s Global Islamic 
Resistance Call, which he published online in January 2005. In this work, his magnum 
opus, Al-Suri outlined his blueprint for “a global terrorist campaign against the West that 
would rely on diffuse, decentralized and non-hierarchical networks.”189 Additionally, he 
pioneered the term “individual jihad” which “refers to acts of violence carried out by 
individuals [or small groups] without any organizational adherence.”190 Al-Suri’s 
blueprint is embodied within the three events outlined above and at its core his Global 
Islamic Resistance Call provides a framework for jihadi unconventional warfare that is 
perfectly tailored for cyberspace and put to full use by the Islamic State. 
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1. Background 
The background for this case study will consist of three sub-sections. The first 
two will discuss Al-Suri and how his doctrine, Global Islamic Resistance Call, can also 
be seen as an outline for Jihadi unconventional warfare. The third part will outline the 
Islamic State’s use of cyber and unconventional warfare-like activities. 
a. Abu Musa’ab Al-Suri the Al-Qaida Strategist 
Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Sitt Maryam Nasar was born in Aleppo, Syria, in 
October 1958; he is known to the world by his nom de guerre Abu Musa’ab Al-Suri.191 
Al-Suri’s life of global jihad began in 1980 when he joined The Combat Vanguard at the 
age of 21 to fight against the Syrian government.192 During the 1980s, Al-Suri conducted 
training in Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt, where he learned military explosive engineering, 
guerrilla warfare, and special operations.193 He quickly became an instructor in these 
subjects and taught in Baghdad, Iraq and Amman, Jordan before seeking exile in Europe, 
where he published his first work titled The Islamic Jihad Revolution in Syria, which was 
“an analysis of the jihadi movement in Syria.”194  
During the late 1980s, he went to Afghanistan and Pakistan to join the Afghan 
jihad where he met Osama bin Laden, conducted operations, and was a military instructor 
at al-Qaida training camps.195 During the early 1990s, he lived in Spain and London, 
England where he opened a media center and continued to study and publish works on 
jihad through print and online media.196 According to Lia, an expert on Al-Suri, during 
this time period Al-Suri wanted to improve “the quality and impact of the jihadi groups’ 
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use of the media, which he then considered one of the very greatest gaps in jihadi 
activity.”197 
During the late 1990s, Al-Suri facilitated media interviews with bin Laden for 
CNN before leaving London for Afghanistan to work in the service of the Taliban.198  
Starting in 1999 and over the course of the following year, Al-Suri established a media 
and research center and the al-Ghuraba training camp with the permission of the Taliban 
near Kabul, Afghanistan.199 At these two locations, Al-Suri began to deliver lectures 
about his ideas of “autonomous cells de-linked from any identifiable organizational 
structure, and whose main method of operation should be individual terrorism,” thus 
propagating his framework for jihadi unconventional warfare, which would be published 
in its entirety several years later in the Global Islamic Resistance Call.200 Sometime after 
the 9/11 attacks, Al-Suri fled to Pakistan where he isolated himself and devoted his time 
to reflection and finalizing the Global Islamic Resistance Call, which he completed in 
late 2004.201 In November 2005, Pakistani police arrested Al-Suri who had a $5 million 
USD bounty on his head from the U.S. Department of State.202 
b. Global Islamic Resistance Call – Framework for Jihadi Unconventional 
Warfare 
Al-Suri’s publication of the Global Islamic Resistance Call is grounded in his 
two-and-a- half decades of jihadi experience ranging from student, trainer, operator, and 
military strategist. This seminal jihadi unconventional warfare framework has earned Al-
Suri titles and nicknames such as “al-Qaida’s leading theoretician and strategic thinker,” 
“architect of global jihad,” “the world’s foremost jihadi theoretician,” “the pen jihadist” 
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and “Castro.”203 Al-Suri saw “himself as a jihadi strategist, theoretician, and thinker, 
rather than an ideologue and a cleric” and grounded his work in the guerrilla strategies of 
Mao Tse-tung, Fidel Castro and Che Guevara.204 
In an article titled “An Analysis of Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s Call to Global Islamic 
Resistance,” Zackie discusses Al-Suri’s 1,600-page, two-part book. He summarizes the 
first part, Roots, History and Experiences, as dealing with Muslim history, the struggle 
with the West, and recent jihadi struggles all rooted within a political, social, and legal 
context.205 Zackie concluded that the first part provides what Al-Suri hopes is a narrative 
to compel popular embrace of his call for global Islamic resistance, leading the reader to 
the second part, Call, Methodology, Way. He says that this second part, which “details the 
theoretical frameworks that…essentially [is] a plan of action that addresses the work to 
be done on the political, educational, military, financial, and media fronts,” is in essence 
Al-Suri’s jihadi unconventional warfare framework.206 
Within this jihadi unconventional warfare framework, Al-Suri advocates two 
main concepts to accommodate the United States’ superior technological military 
advantages in a post 9/11 world: “individual jihad and small cell terrorism” and “a 
system, not a secret organization.”207 Al-Suri describes individual jihad and small cell 
terrorism as “…single operations…carried out by individuals or small groups” that are 
decentralized and do not adhere to hierarchical organizational structures.208 Al-Suri’s 
second main concept, usually referred to as “a system, not a secret organization” may be 
translated literally from Arabic as “system of action, not a centralized, secret organization 
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for action.”209 Al-Suri states, “[t]he idea is based on the concept that the bonds between 
the entire spectrum of Resistance fighters – individuals, cells, units and small groups – 
are limited to…[a]…program of beliefs, a system of action, a common name, and a 
common goal” and further elaborates there should not be any connections between 
“Resistance Fighters.”210 
In summary, Al-Suri’s Global Islamic Resistance Call, “…invites its readers to 
self-recruit and become independent terrorists…” which, individuals can now do through 
cyberspace and from the comfort of their own home without ever physically meeting one 
another. This modern technological enhancement to UW has been lethally demonstrated 
in the events outlined in the beginning of this chapter by the Islamic State.211 In addition 
to creating a jihadi unconventional warfare framework, Al-Suri called for and used 
technology, specifically cyberspace, to reach the masses and enhance the jihadi resistance 
movement, which al-Suri promoted in the areas of recruitment, indoctrination, training 
and operations. 
c. The Islamic State 
The Islamic State, as it is now known, is a terrorist organization that morphed 
from an Al-Qaeda offshoot to its current form, controlling large areas of territory in Syria 
and Iraq and administering a de-facto state-like enterprise with a borderline standing 
army.212 The analysis of the Islamic State within this chapter is limited in scope to its use 
of cyberspace operations for the purposes of recruitment, indoctrination, training and 
operations. The Islamic State has successfully implemented Al-Suri’s jihadi 
unconventional warfare framework by having individuals self-recruit, self-indoctrinate, 
and self-train, all via cyberspace, and then conduct “individual jihad” (known in the U.S. 
as “lone wolf attacks”).213 
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This section is broken into two parts. The first will describe the Al-Suri model for 
exploitation of cyberspace for the purposes of global Jihad. The second part will describe 
how the Islamic State uses cyberspace to enhance their operations. 
a. Al-Suri’s Use of Cyberspace 
Al-Suri is credited with being “the chief architect of al-Qaeda’s contemporary 
Internet movement” because he advocated using cyberspace to provide the means for 
individuals to self-recruit, self-indoctrinate, and self-train.214 With these cyber-enabled 
capabilities any jihadi can than conduct an operation, if they so choose.  
Al-Suri used his own website, The Library of Shaykh Umar Abd al-Hakim-Abu 
Mus’ab al-Suri: Your Guide to the Way of Jihad, and other online jihadi forums to 
publish written works, lectures via video, and audio files with the intent to recruit and 
indoctrinate individuals.215 Additionally, Al-Suri used cyberspace to train individuals by 
publishing jihadi military doctrine and “how to” videos and lectures on guerrilla 
warfare.216 
Early in the 1990s, Al-Suri recognized the power of cyberspace and the benefits it 
could provide to those who harnessed it. Although he does not use the term “Collective 
Action,”217 his numerous online works culminating with his Global Islamic Resistance 
Call, provide the ideological foundation to overcome the “start-up problem” - when 
people look past their individual motivations and participate in a larger group behavior - 
“individual jihad” combined with “a system.”218 More than a decade has passed since Al-
Suri’s magnum opus was published, and no other non-state actor has been more 
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successful in using cyberspace to recruit, indoctrinate, train, and operationalize 
“individual jihad” than the Al-Qaeda offshoot, the Islamic State.219 
b. The Islamic State’s Use of Cyberspace 
The Islamic State uses social media as the cornerstone of its cyberspace 
operations and “its innovative and aggressive approach has afforded it an unprecedented 
level of success.”220 The Islamic State appears to have cracked the code on the conditions 
required for social mobilization via the Internet in regards to recruiting, indoctrinating, 
and training, leading directly to operations. During testimony at Jihad 2.0: Social Media 
in the Next Evolution of Terrorist Recruitment on May 7, 2015 before the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Berger highlighted how, 
“since the beginning of 2015, at least 30 Americans in 13 States have been subject to law 
enforcement action for attempting to join ISIS or carry out violence inspired by ISIS. In 
every case, a significant social media component was found in the radicalization 
[indoctrination] or recruitment process.”221 
Another cyberspace operation employed by the Islamic State is the production 
and distribution of its own slick and flashy magazine called Dabiq. This magazine is 
available in several languages including English and published on the Internet mainly to 
recruit and indoctrinate individuals.222 
The Islamic State is also a prolific user of Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, 
which are designed to connect individuals and deliver content via the Internet, to recruit, 
indoctrinate and train individuals.223 Cinema-quality propaganda videos are produced 
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and posted to these social media sites allowing for individuals to self-recruit, self-
indoctrinate, and self-train. Additionally, the Islamic State uses private social media 
platforms, such as Kik and WhatsApp, and private Facebook messages, to conduct more 
sensitive conversations and perhaps recruiting and planning operations abroad.224 The 
Islamic State has become so successful at recruiting individuals through social media 
from a continent or two away, that the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center’s Zafar 
coined the term “peer-to-peer recruiting” to call attention to the phenomenon.225 
The Islamic State even created its own app in April 2014, titled “Dawn of Glad 
Tidings,” which provided users with exclusive Islamic State content and allowed users to 
post the content to their Twitter account.226 Behind the scenes and unknown to the users, 
the Islamic State app collected users’ personal data as well as revenues through 
advertising.227 Additionally, when used with a Twitter app, the Islamic State app could 
be automatically set up by users to re-tweet content and also contained “…computer code 
that could take control of a consenting user’s account to automatically send out 
tweets.”228 By December 2014, the Islamic State had created thousands of computer 
“bots,” most of which were used to automatically tweet links and videos of sensational 
propaganda, such as beheadings, in order to recruit and indoctrinate individuals to their 
cause.229 
3. Summary 
Cyberspace provides the Islamic State with an infinite number of potential 
recruits with the only limiting factor being an Internet connection. Al-Suri and the 
Islamic State have provided the means for individuals with an Internet connection to self-
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recruit, self-indoctrinate, and self-train through platforms such as online publications, 
Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and WhatsApp. The Islamic State has proven through 
events in Paris, Garland, and Boston, that individuals do not have to physically travel to 
Iraq and Syria to fight on behalf of the Islamic State but can conduct “individual jihad” 
through means available in cyberspace, in the cities and countries from which they 
connect to the Internet. 
Al-Suri’s and the Islamic State’s use of cyberspace operations to conduct 
unconventional warfare-like operations in the four selected activities from this case study 
are highlighted in the analysis framework shown in Figure 7. 





The previous chapters of this thesis show that social mobilization is critical to 
understanding the theoretical underpinnings for why individuals would accept the severe 
risks of joining an insurgent organization for the purpose of conducting UW. Through a 
comprehensive literature review, four areas of activity were examined to determine what 
conditions, present in the cyberspace environment, could enhance the conduct of UW. By 
conducting an examination across the four distinct cases, through the lens of the four 
activities, we were able to find evidence to support our two claims and identified five 
additional conditions that existed for cyber-enabled UW. 
The first section of this chapter examines the two claims and identifies the 
evidence supporting them. The second section describes five similar conditions that were 
present across the cases and enhanced the conduct of cyber-enabled UW. The third 
section describes how Social Network Analysis has the potential to enhance a cyber-
enabled UW organization across the four activities analyzed. The fourth section of this 
chapter recommends the organization, structure, training, and equipment of a 
hypothetical cyber-enabled UW team. The final section examines the barrier between the 
cyber and physical domains and how they can be influenced by cyber-enabled UW 
operations. 
A. CLAIMS 
1. Virtual Environment and Social Mobilization 
Our first claim, that a low cost of entry, sparse regulations, and anonymity of 
users in the virtual environment facilitates social mobilization and recruiting of proxy 
forces during cyber-enabled UW operations, was supported by evidence contained in the 
two Russian case studies and the case study involving non-state actors. Russia exploited 
the cyber domain in both Georgia and Ukraine, using a combination of proxy cyber 
forces to mobilize populations both in the cyber and physical domains. In the case 
involving non-state actors, both Al Suri and the Islamic State used cyberspace to mobilize 
populations through websites, chat rooms, and online publications. Individuals that were 
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mobilized, whether as part of “troll armies” or “peer-to-peer” recruiting, incurred a 
minimal cost to participate. All that was required was an Internet capable device and an 
Internet connection, limited regulation, and massive anonymity when using private and 
secure media platforms and software. Cyberspace enhanced the social mobilization 
factors within each case study and demonstrated the effectiveness of recruiting proxy 
forces, specifically during cyber-enabled UW operations. 
2. Cyberspace as a Platform for Unconventional Warfare 
Claim two, which asserts that the speed of information and the vast amount of 
multi-media content makes cyberspace an excellent platform for UW resistance groups to 
organize, train, and conduct operations, is supported by evidence from the three case 
studies that employed cyber-enabled UW-like operations. The case studies demonstrate 
that numerous cyberspace platforms were used, including online “how to” videos, social 
media platforms, and specially designed “apps” (both by the Russians and non-state 
actors) to organize, train, and conduct operations. The Islamic State appears to have 
mastered this skillset and is able to fully recruit, train, and operationalize individuals via 
cyberspace to carry out operations on the other side of the globe without ever physically 
meeting those conducting the operation. UW organizations only need to have the ability 
to put content out into cyberspace, which if done correctly, can almost instantaneously 
reach any user in the world with an Internet connection. The case studies firmly 
demonstrate that numerous platforms available in cyberspace, if harnessed correctly, can 
be used for UW resistance groups to organize, train, and conduct operations. 
B. CYBER-ENABLED UW CONDITIONS PRESENT IN THE CASES 
Unconventional Warfare is not new. What is new is the advent of cyberspace and 
the ability for like-minded people or organizations to connect with one another and to 
reach a mass audience like never before. Cyberspace has enhanced the ability of people 
to mobilize from anywhere in the world, and all that is required is a cheap smart phone 
and a free WiFi connection. The case studies demonstrate that five similar conditions are 
present across the activities analyzed, (recruitment, indoctrination, training, and 
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operationalizing), which support successful cyber-enabled UW-like operations, in 
addition to the two claims above. 
A common condition that was present across all four case studies and the UW 
activities analyzed was that an ethnic, cultural, or ideological similarity existed between 
the individuals that partook in the social mobilization and the UW-type organization that 
led the operation. Prior to the advent of cyberspace, as demonstrated in the Detachment 
101 case, the conductors of UW would have to meet in-person to build upon the social 
mobilization that occurred in order to recruit, indoctrinate, train, and conduct operations. 
Cyberspace provides the capability for individuals of an ethnic, cultural, or ideological 
similarity to meet virtually, from halfway around the world through numerous social 
media sites, with the click of a few buttons.,  
The second condition present across the four cases was that the actors conducting 
the UW-like operation felt that it was a legitimate action and the cause was just. 
Legitimacy is extremely important for any UW operation and manifested itself in similar 
ways across the cases. Legitimacy was reinforced in the Russian case studies by drawing 
on ethnic and cultural components and in the non-state actor case study through ideology, 
specifically Al-Suri’s Global Islamic Resistance Call. Cyber-enabled UW allows 
individuals of a similar ethnic, cultural, or ideological identity to participate in a 
perceived to be legitimate UW-like operation without actually physically showing-up on 
the battlefield, if they so choose. 
The third condition was the exploitation of existing groups, organizations, or 
networks to assist in conducting UW-like operations, with cyberspace providing 
numerous opportunities that otherwise would not have existed. In the South Ossetia case, 
Russia used proxies to facilitate operations on the cyber battlefield and the RBN 
advanced software and hacking techniques against Georgia. In Crimea, Russia used “troll 
armies” to spread the Russian narrative of events through numerous social media 
platforms. The non-state actor case showed that Al-Suri published his Global Islamic 
Resistance Call and jihad and guerrilla warfare “how to” videos on the Internet, instantly 
available to anyone with an Internet connection. The Islamic State successfully employed 
computer “bots” to send propaganda via web-links and video. Cyber-enabled UW allows 
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an actor to leverage cyberspace capabilities that are not otherwise available to them and 
reach a mass audience with ease. 
A fourth condition observed in the three most recent case studies was the 
existence of a susceptible population that was connected to the Internet. Cyberspace 
reduced barriers to, and increased the reach of, the UW organizations to engage 
susceptible populations within the activities of recruitment, indoctrination, training, and 
conducting UW-like operations. The Islamic State appears to be the most successful in 
cyber-enabled UW-like operations and exploiting this condition. This pseudo-state 
creates and publishes Dabiq, their online magazine in multiple languages to indoctrinate 
individuals. They use “peer-to-peer” recruiting as well as open and private social media 
platforms to recruit and train individuals. These individuals then conduct UW-like 
operations on behalf of the Islamic State without ever physically meeting an Islamic State 
trainer or recruiter, as showcased in Garland, Texas. Cyber-enabled UW reduces the 
barrier to any participant and increases their potential reach to susceptible populations as 
long as both parties have some sort of Internet connection and a basic web-surfing 
device. 
The fifth and final condition that presented itself was that the nature of the 
conflict itself had to be such that Unconventional Warfare was an appropriate strategy to 
achieve the desired outcomes. The timeframe of the conflict must be expansive enough to 
allow for UW-like operations, although this timeframe has the potential to be compressed 
for cyber-enabled UW. The social environment must be conducive and complex enough 
to allow a UW-type organization to exploit the sympathetic social fragmentations in favor 
of the UW organization. A cyber-enabled UW approach will allow for a more expansive 
and flexible exploitation of sympathetic groups than has previously been possible.  
With these seven conditions present, cyber-enabled UW may reduce the risk and 
the cost of conducting UW-like operations. Within both Russian case studies, Putin’s 
proxies conducted successful cyber-attacks against both Georgia and the Ukraine 
command and control and critical infrastructures, rendering them useless during the UW 
operations. Prior to the advent of cyberspace, Russia would have had to risk men and 
military hardware to achieve the same results. Now all that is needed is a trained cyber-
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operator, a laptop, and an Internet connection. The Islamic State also demonstrated the 
reduced risk and cost of conducting cyber-enabled UW-like operations. The Islamic 
State’s creation and employment of the Twitter app, Dawn of Glad Tidings, demonstrated 
that for a very low cost to the organization, they could potentially reach anyone on 
Twitter. Cyber-enabled UW reduces the risk and cost of conducting operations through 
cyberspace to the UW organization both in terms of potential lives on the line and 
resources required to accomplish stated objectives. 
Cyber-enabled UW has implications for providing delayed attribution and 
enabling anonymous action. This allows for control over the conflict narrative. If the 
conflict narrative is controlled the UW organization can share, obscure, or manipulate 
information with certain parties at a time of their choosing. This can enhance a UW 
organization’s flexibility within the political and diplomatic arenas. Russia’s use of 
cyber-enabled UW to annex Crimea showcases the ways in which attribution can be 
controlled and the narrative shaped to further a political agenda. 
C. THE POTENTIAL OF SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
Although the case studies do not specifically identify any cyber-enabled UW team 
employing SNA as described in Chapter II, one could only imagine the power this 
technique could unleash for a UW organization. SNA techniques and software have the 
potential to enhance a cyber-enabled UW team’s capabilities to identify evaluate, 
indoctrinate, and recruit proxy forces. Even though none of the case studies uncovered 
the use of SNA, evidence was provided showing numerous social media platforms and 
specially designed software were used during the three cases that employed cyber-
enabled UW-like operations. These platforms and special software were directed towards 
an intended target audience in order to recruit, indoctrinate, train, and eventually 
operationalize proxy forces. Given the success of the cyber-enabled UW-like operations 
identified in the case studies, even though they did not employ SNA, using these 
techniques could have potentially enhanced their efforts. 
Using commercial of the shelf SNA software, a cyber-enabled UW team could 
target and scrape data from publically available social media sites, information from 
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websites, and identify networks that already exist which could be used as potential proxy 
forces. This targeted approach using SNA techniques and software would increase the 
cyber-enabled UW team’s ability to quickly and more accurately identify, evaluate, 
indoctrinate, and recruit proxy forces when compared to the techniques effectively 
demonstrated in the case studies. 
D. A CYBER-ENABLED UW TEAM 
The previous section of this chapter describes the base conditions that are 
necessary to exploit the cyber environment to enhance the execution of UW. 
Understanding these conditions is the key to operationalizing a force to exploit concepts 
uncovered in previous chapters. In addition, it is necessary to determine the organization, 
training, and equipment needed to conduct cyber-enabled UW. 
To develop a preliminary concept for what a cyber-enabled UW team should 
consist of, two commands of the U.S. military need to be examined. The first of these 
commands is the United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). The second is the 
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and its subordinate the United 
States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). The following two sections will 
look at each of these commands to determine if the requisite capabilities necessary for 
cyber-enabled UW are present in existing organizations. A third section will recommend 
the ideal structure, training, and equipment for a cyber-enabled UW team. 
1. USCYBERCOM 
USCYBERCOM is the U.S. military’s proponent organization for all offensive 
and defensive operations conducted in cyberspace. In addition, it is also responsible for 
all Department of Defense Information Networks (DODIN).230 This command’s 
responsibilities and authorities overlap with organizations that conduct Electronic 
Warfare (EW) and Information Operations (IO). Although significant overlap exists, 
USCYBERCOM doctrine does not specifically reference Special Operations except as a 
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force and equipment provider.231 According to their mission statement, USCYBERCOM 
first and foremost is concerned with enabling and protecting DODIN. In addition, they 
will protect U.S. military maneuvers in cyberspace and deny the same to our enemies.232 
Cyber doctrine does not address UW operations supported through cyberspace, 
nor does it allocate forces for such a purpose.233 Forces associated with cyber 
organizations in the U.S. military continue to grow exponentially, but USCYBERCOM 
does not have an organization, currently in its ranks, that is prepared for, or that could be 
tailored for the purpose of supporting cyber-enabled UW.234 
This being said, USCYBERCOM is a critical organization that needs to be 
leveraged for the training and equipping of a cyber-enabled UW team. USCYBERCOM’s 
focus on advanced techniques and technologies necessary to operate in the complex cyber 
domain will act as a critical enabler to cyber focused UW forces. One of the first, and 
enduring, tasks of a proposed cyber-enabled UW team will be to establish and maintain a 
positive relationship with USCYBERCOM and its subordinate service elements 
(particularly Army Cyber Command). This relationship will enable a UW focused team 
to have the latest intelligence, technologies, and techniques to identify and exploit 
conditions present in the cyber environment for the purposes of recruiting, indoctrinating, 
training, and operationalizing proxy forces prior to physical infiltration of U.S. troops. 
2. USSOCOM and USASOC 
USSOCOM is responsible for the conduct of operations to enable resistance and 
insurgent organization for a variety of purposes described in detail in previous chapters of 
this thesis. Tasks conducted within these operations are broadly referred to as UW. 
USSOCOM has tasked USASOC as the proponent command for the conduct of UW per 
                                                 
231 Ibid. 
232 “USCYBERCOM,” U.S. Army Cyber Command, accessed October 25, 2015, 
http://www.arcyber.army.mil/org-uscc.html. 
233 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Cyberspace Operations [JP 3-12 (R)]. 
234 Cheryl Pellerin, “Cybercom Chief: Cyber Threats Blur Roles, Relationships,” Department of 
Defense News, March 6, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/604225; Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Cyberspace Operations [JP 3-12 (R)]. 
 78 
the command’s directive 10–1.235 Additionally, joint special operations doctrine assigns 
U.S. Army Special Forces additional importance in conducting UW.236 
The base unit of action for a Special Operations Group (under USASOC) is a 
Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (SFODA). This small unit is uniquely 
organized, trained, and equipped to achieve strategic effects through operations 
conducted at the tactical and operational levels. An SFODA consists of twelve 
individuals that receive extensive training in tactics and weapons, intelligence, 
engineering, demolition, communication, and medical operations.237 Although UW is a 
prominent feature in both joint and army special operations doctrine, integration of cyber 
capabilities, or the conduct of UW in the cyber domain, is not included in current 
manuals.238 Given the current lack of skills necessary for the conduct of UW operations 
in the cyber domain, an SFODA would need a substantial amount of advanced training 
and equipment to achieve proficiency in this very different domain of warfare. Special 
Forces (SF) operators are specifically selected and trained for flexibility in complex 
environments, but adding additional (primarily technical) capabilities would change the 
nature of the unit. This suggests that a new organization should be considered to enhance 
and contribute to an SFODA’s ability to conduct UW operations in the cyber domain. 
3. A New Unit 
The previous two sections reveal that an organization specifically tailored to 
exploiting the cyber environment to enhance UW goals currently does not exist. To better 
exploit the conditions identified in previous chapters, a new organization should be 
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considered for this purpose. This new element would be built to support an SFODA, 
which receives extensive training on UW theory and practice. Although the SFODA 
would be heavily involved in recruiting, indoctrinating, training, and ultimately 
operationalizing digital networks, the unit’s main purpose is continuing these functions in 
the physical world (if and when a UW operation crosses the cyber to physical boundary). 
Additionally, an extensive network of personnel involved in both cyber operations (at 
USCYBERCOM), UW experts (at USSOCOM and USASOC), and interagency partners 
should be formed. This network will support and facilitate all cyber-enabled UW 
operations and considerably reduce any operational overlap between the commands and 
other interagency organizations. 
Duggan suggests that the core element for a cyber UW team should be built 
around the currently existing army SF team. In this concept, a “cyber-pilot team” would 
prepare the environment in a host country through cyberspace, drastically reducing the 
risks that physical infiltration into enemy territory would otherwise entail. In his model, 
the same team that conducted these initial tasks would also physically deploy forward 
once the environment and insurgent organizations were sufficiently prepared.239 
Depending on the size and dispersion of forces, one or more SFODAs could be required 
to infiltrate into the UW operational area. 
In order to not lose continuity in the digital world, once a physical deployment is 
deemed necessary, it would be unwise to use an SFODA, which is uniquely trained and 
equipped to execute UW in the physical world. In order to mitigate this, a new cyber-
enabled UW team needs to be established. This team needs to reside within USASOC 
and directly support a Special Forces Group’s UW activities. Potentially, the cyber-
enabled UW team could fall under a Special Forces Group’s Support Battalion or a 
Psychological Operations Battalion. 
This purely cyber-focused team would be primarily staffed with regionally 
focused Special Operations Forces personnel. Additionally, a host of military and 
interagency enablers would be necessary to advise and support the team. SMT, SNA, and 
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online social media experts from the military, interagency community, and academia 
would help the team exploit factors that lead to social mobilization. Linguists and cultural 
experts are critical to creating believable content that aids in cyber-enabled UW tasks. 
Additionally, Geospatial intelligence experts could assist in mapping the complex human 
and physical infrastructure discovered through cyberspace. Military or interagency 
personnel capable of conducting cyber and real world human intelligence support 
operations are also critical enablers. Offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, resourced 
through USCYBERCOM and the National Security Agency, will be critical in enhancing 
the legitimacy of an insurgent organization as well as diminishing the legitimacy of the 
incumbent government. 
The enablers described in the previous paragraph are by no means a complete list. 
Based on the nature and scope of the UW operation, additional capabilities may be 
necessary. A credible unit for conducting cyber-enabled UW operations does not 
currently exist, and therefore needs to be formed and tested to better understand the exact 
organization, training, and equipment required to support UW operations. 
E. CROSSING THE THRESHOLD 
Cyber-enabled UW teams can utilize the conducive environment provided by the 
Internet to produce content that will draw members of potential or existing resistance 
organizations together. These teams can additionally identify intelligence, operational 
information, and psychological factors that are present in the UW environment. Then 
teams can passively select potential members that are drawn to this content. After 
prospective recruits, groups, or networks are selected, indoctrination can begin. 
Next, virtual training of recruited individuals and groups commences. This 
training includes the distribution of materials that will enhance the resistance posture of 
these groups in both kinetic and non-kinetic techniques, to include (but not limited to) 
sabotage, subversion, and non-violent resistance techniques. Additional organization of 
revolutionary groups is also possible utilizing online techniques, but may require a 
physical presence if complete control of the organization is desired. Building the network 
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of an UW group is possible using only cyber means, but the larger the network becomes 
the more difficult it is to maintain control. 
Finally, a call to action is a key step when operationalizing UW groups. This key 
step, while possible through the virtual world, is not likely to occur without the 
introduction of personnel to facilitate additional coordination with groups in the physical 
world. This is the point where an SFODA would need to deploy, if one has not already 
infiltrated into the area of operations, to continue the UW operation. However, even when 
this digital to physical boundary is crossed, the work of the digital team must continue. 
Maintaining an online UW presence will not only inform the physical team in theater, it 
will also continue to build, maintain, and organize resistance groups and activities that 
fall outside of the spectrum of control of the UW focused SFODA in the host country. 
At some point, in the course of a cyber-enabled UW campaign, planners have to 
assess the risk of not having operators physically on the ground, necessary to increase 
control over proxy forces conducting UW activities. The exact nature of the digital to 
physical boundary will differ depending on a multitude of factors in the operating 
environment. Although an operation where UW tasks can be executed completely in the 
cyber domain is entirely possible, the vast majority of operations will most likely require 
the physical deployment of U.S. forces. Despite this fact, conducting cyber-enabled UW 
operations will enable U.S. UW professionals to impact a mature theater when physical 
infiltration is not a viable option. When an SFODA is deployed in support of a UW 
operation, the relationship with cyber-enabled UW team must be built and maintained. 
This mutually supporting relationship will facilitate the coordination between the digital 
and physical UW efforts. Constant communication between these two teams will help to 
eliminate mission overlap and ensure continuity of efforts. This, in turn, will reduce the 
physical risk to soldiers on the ground and the political risk to policymakers. 
Since no organization with the requisite capabilities to exploit conditions in the 
cyber domain to enhance UW currently exists, one should be created. This team will 
require specialized education in social mobilization theory, training in advanced cyber 
and UW techniques, specialized equipment, and legal authorities. The core of this team 
should come from the Army SOF community since they are the military UW proponent 
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organization. Additional enablers will need to come from the military cyber force, 
academia, and the broader interagency community. To be successful, this organization 
will need to be comprised of a wide range of both military and civilian professionals with 
a diverse range of skillsets. 
The mission that would be conducted by a cyber-enabled UW team could 
potentially overlap with missions of other organizations in USCYBERCOM, 
USSOCOM, and other interagency organizations. To avoid duplication of effort between 
organizations, a requirement for cyber capabilities, in support of UW operations, should 
be created by USSOCOM. A cyber-enabled UW team can then be staffed by the best 
qualified military, interagency, and civilian organization. Once created, the team should 
be permanently tasked to support USASOC and their organic UW focused SFODAs. This 
will streamline authorities and negate any potential organizational infighting. Creating, 
staffing, training, and equipping a cyber-enabled UW team will not be an easy task. It 
will require an immense amount of networking and coordination between multiple high-
level military commands, interagency organizations, and potentially require input from 
national level policymakers. Training and equipping the group will also be an arduous, 
and perhaps, cumbersome process. Despite these obstacles, cyber-enabled UW will 




The first section of this chapter will summarize the seven conditions identified 
through the evidence provided in the cases that can enhance unconventional warfare 
through cyberspace operations - cyber-enabled UW. The second section recommends the 
creation of a cyber-enabled UW team and the final section will propose possible avenues 
of further research. 
A. CONDITIONS FOR CYBER-ENABLED UW 
This research indicates, through the four cases analyzed, that seven conditions 
exist in the cyberspace environment that can enhance the conduct of UW. The first 
condition present was that a low cost of entry, sparse regulations, and anonymity of users 
in the virtual environment facilitates social mobilization and recruiting of proxy forces 
during cyber-enabled UW operations. The second condition that presented itself was that 
the speed of information and the vast amount of multi-media content makes cyberspace 
an excellent platform for UW resistance groups to organize, train, and conduct 
operations. A third condition identified that an ethnic, cultural, or ideological similarity 
existed between the individuals that partook in the social mobilization and the UW-type 
organization that led the operation. The fourth condition evident was the importance of 
legitimacy, specifically that actors conducting the UW-like operation felt that it was a 
legitimate action and the cause was just. The fifth condition was the exploitation of 
existing groups, organizations, or networks to assist in conducting UW-like operations, 
with cyberspace providing numerous opportunities that otherwise would not have existed. 
The sixth condition present in the three most recent case studies was the existence of a 
susceptible population connected to the Internet. A final and important condition that 
manifested itself was that the nature of the conflict itself had to be such that UW was an 
appropriate strategy to achieve the desired outcomes. 
These seven conditions should be exploited by UW practitioners to identify 
counter-state organizations that support the goals of U.S. military and policy makers. By 
conducting many of the preliminary tasks of UW in the cyber domain, the timeframe for 
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physically deploying troops to enemy held territory could be pushed significantly into the 
latter phases of an operation or campaign. Additionally, even when it becomes necessary 
to deploy soldiers into an UW theater, deployed teams will benefit from a more 
developed and mature operating environment. 
B. CYBER-ENABLED UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE TEAM 
No cyber-enabled UW team currently exists. An organization with the requisite 
capabilities to exploit the conditions previously identified in the cyber domain should be 
created. This team will require specialized education in social mobilization theory, 
training in advanced cyber and UW techniques, specialized equipment, and legal 
authorities. The core of this team should come from the Army SOF community since they 
are the military UW proponent organization. Additional enablers will need to come from 
the military cyber force, academia, and the broader interagency community. To be 
successful this organization will need to be comprised of a wide range of both military 
and civilian professionals with a diverse range of skillsets. 
The mission of this proposed cyber-enabled UW team could potentially overlap 
with missions of USCYBERCOM, USSOCOM, and other interagency organizations. To 
avoid duplication of effort between organizations, a requirement for cyber capabilities, in 
support of UW operations, should be created by USSOCOM. A cyber-enabled UW team 
can then be staffed by the best qualified personnel from the military, interagency, and 
other civilian organization. Once created, the team should be permanently tasked to 
support USASOC and their organic UW focused SFODAs. This will streamline 
authorities and negate any potential organizational infighting. The creation of a cyber-
enabled UW team will require an immense amount of coordination between multiple 
high-level military commands, interagency organizations, and potentially require input 
from national level policymakers. Training and equipping the group will also not be easy. 
Despite these obstacles, cyber-enabled UW will provide U.S. leadership with additional 
options to achieve its foreign policy goals. 
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C. FURTHER RESEARCH 
The scope of this research did not fully address all aspects pertinent to the 
creation and sustainment of a cyber-enabled UW capability. Additional research should 
first, and foremost, focus on validating the conditions and evidence examined in this 
research. Further research should analyze the authorities necessary to conduct covert and 
clandestine operations on foreign soil and in cyberspace. The topics of plausible 
deniability, low visibility operations, and commercial cover operations should be 
considered when conducting a review of requisite authorities. This thesis also did not 
adequately address the full range of organizations that conduct operations in the cyber 
domain. In order to fully train, equip, and staff a cyber-enabled UW organization, it 
would first be necessary to understand the current range of capabilities being employed 
by U.S. cyber professionals. Finally, a review of ethical and legal cyber activities and 
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